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ABSTRACT
For the past few decades, many incidents of sectarian violence have been triggered by
rumors of interfaith sexual and romantic relationships between Muslims and Coptic
Christians in Egypt. This thesis argues that the ways in which the Egyptian modern state
chooses to govern women’s bodies and address the Coptic question has inevitably enabled
sectarian violence witnessed today to take on its current form. One of the main implications
of the modernization of the Egyptian legal system was the state’s ability to “jam” women,
family, sexuality and religion into the private sphere, as opposed to the public sphere. This
essentially has created a form of “cross-contamination” in which the religious came to
appropriate the family, and the family acquired the quality of the religious. To that end,
this thesis tells the story of the “affective, visceral, corporeal workings of everyday state
power” that coheres that cross-contamination between the spheres of the family and
religion. Through using the tools offered to it by modernity, the Egyptian modern state has
been able to maintain a similar religious hierarchy to that which existed in the Ottoman era,
only this time it has confined this religious hierarchy almost exclusively to the domain of
the family. One of the main outcomes of such an arrangement is that political conflicts over
religious difference often end up unfolding over the terrain of familial and sexual
relationships. By regulating love, the state has concretized the conservatism of both the
Muslim and Coptic communities and has produced a space for sectarian violence over
women’s bodies, sexuality and romance.
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I.

Introduction

This thesis is an attempt to produce a genealogical account of state restrictions placed on
interfaith romantic and sexual relationships between Muslims and Coptic Christians in
Egypt today. It is also an effort to investigate the interplay between legal pluralism,
gender relations, and sectarian identities under the auspices of the modern Egyptian state.
Building on Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality,1 I argue that the modern
Egyptian nation-state became the de facto arbiter in regulating “the private” sphere—
sexuality, intimacy, and marriage.
One of the main implications of the modernization of the Egyptian legal system was the
state’s ability to “jam” women, family, sexuality and religion into the private sphere, as
opposed to the public sphere.2 This essentially created a form of “cross-contamination” in
which the religious came to appropriate the family, and the family acquired the quality of
the religious.3 To that end, I am telling the story of the “affective, visceral, corporeal
workings of everyday state power”4 that cohered that cross-contamination between the
spheres of the family and religion.
This thesis presents a critique of the codification and secularization of the legal system
which constitutes the cornerstone of the modern and postcolonial Egyptian state. It is a
critique of the modernization process in Egypt which helped shape and transform
religious-based personal status laws into their current form. I situate sectarian violence
precisely in this modernization process. More specifically, I explore the relationship
between interreligious love and marriage, and sectarian violence through the lens of the
modern state.

MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY )Graham
Burchell et al eds., University of Chicago Press, 1991) (1991).
2
SABA MAHMOOD, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR AGE: A MINORITY REPORT, 26,
(Princeton University Press, 2016), (2016).
3
Id.
4
Asli Zengin, Violent Intimacies: Tactile State Power, Sex/Gender Transgression, and the Politics of Touch
in Contemporary Turkey, 12 JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST WOMENS STUDIES, 225, 225–245 (2016).
1

1

On May 2016, a video of a Muslim mob stripping and parading naked, Soad Thabet, an
elderly 70-year old Coptic woman on the streets of al-Karam village in Minya province
circulated social media platforms. The hashtag “Egypt stripped naked” even trended on
Twitter following the incident.5 Sectarian violence, involving around 300 people, erupted
in Minya province after a rumor that Mrs. Thabet’s son was involved in a love affair with
a Muslim woman circulated the small village of al-Karam.6 The police initially arrested
six men suspected of taking part in the violence7, but in January 2017, the case was
dropped by Egyptian prosecutors.8 The prosecutors cited the “lack of evidence” as the
reason behind their decision to drop the case despite the fact that Mrs. Thabet identified
three of the men she said assaulted her.9 On the other hand, Mrs Thabet’s son, Ashraf
Abdo Attia, and the woman he allegedly had an affair with were found guilty of adultery
and were sentenced to serve two years in prison and pay a penalty of 1,000 Egyptian
pounds.10 In addition, Attia’s entire family was forced to flee the village and could not
return to their homes because of threats by Muslim extremists in the village.11
Such an incident should not be treated as an isolated incident. Sectarian violence set off
by rumors of interfaith sexual and romantic relationships has become a common
occurrence in Egypt since President Anwar al-Sadat’s era until today. This thesis will is
an attempt to investigate the reasons behind why this particular form of sectarian violence
continues to take place until today. Since it’s important to remember to concretize the
discussion from the abstractions of modernity to the concreteness of lived experiences of

5

Muslim Mob In Egypt Strips 70-Year-Old Christian Woman, THE GUARDIAN, May 26, 2016.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/muslim-mob-in-egypt-strips-elderly-christian-womanin-violent-attack
6
Egypt Affair Rumours Spark Inter-Religious Violence, BBC NEWS, May 26, 2016.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36391383
7
Id.
8
Raf Sanchez & Magdy Samaan, Egypt Drops Case Against Men Accused Of Beating Christian
Grandmother – But Prosecutes Her Son For Adultery, THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 16, 2017.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/16/egypt-drops-case-against-men-accused-beating-christiangrandmother/
9
Id.
10
Nader Shokri, Son Of «El-Karam Lady» Imprisoned For Two Years For Adultery, WATANI, July 27,
2017. http://www.wataninet.com/2017/07/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86/
11
Egypt Affair Rumours Spark Inter-Religious Violence, supra note 6.
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actual human-brings, similar incidents of sectarian violence will be discussed and
analyzed throughout this thesis.
The first chapter of this thesis interrogates the modern legal technologies that helped
preserve the long-standing legal ban on interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and
a non-Muslim man. It investigates the late nineteenth century secularization and
codification processes, which shaped and transformed sectarian identities and patriarchal
structures into their current status in Egyptian family law. This chapter examines the
features that underscore the centrality of the modern state, and especially its legal power,
for secularism in the Egyptian context.
A genealogy of the current legal ban on interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman
and a non-Muslim man reveals a lot about both the dynamics of Coptic-Muslim relations
in Egypt and the discrimination against women in both communities. Thus, the second
chapter investigates how the modernization of the Egyptian legal system and the
introduction of religious-based personal status laws impacted gender relations both in
Muslim and Coptic communities. In this second chapter, I argue that the modernization
of the Egyptian legal framework resulted in placing limits on and solidifying the ceiling
for progressive reforms when it came to questions of women’s rights and gender equality
both in the Muslim and the Coptic personal status laws.
The third chapter of this thesis, explores how the modernization of the Egyptian legal
system and the introduction of religion-based personal status laws impacted both the unit
of the “family” and sectarian identities. I argue that the modernization process saddled
personal status laws - and by extension the “family” – with the inordinate weight of being
the site of the reproduction and preservation of religious identity. One of the main
consequences of this was enabling any reform attempts aimed at the Coptic personal
status law to be framed as a violation of the Coptic minority’s collective right to
“religious freedom”. Unsurprisingly, the right of Copts to “religious freedom” is an
especially contentious subject given the status of Copts as a minority living in a country
where the principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation.
The fourth chapter looks at modern liberal conceptions of citizenship and inspects how
they are being utilized to conceal religious difference under the pretense of equal
3

citizenship and national unity. These conceptions presuppose the “inclusion” rather than
“exclusion” of different religious identities in Egypt, which help disguise every-day
religious discrimination as well as larger structures of oppression directed towards
Egypt’s Coptic minority. This chapter also examines how different authoritarian regimes,
starting with Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s regime, were able to manipulate sectarian identities
and cleavages to score political gains. It argues that these regimes’ chosen approach when
dealing with incidents of sectarian nature have in fact abetted in generating sectarian
violence. I examine how the state, in its different authoritarian moments, has used
informal reconciliation sessions and the State Security Investigation Service to deal with
cases of sectarian violence pertaining to interfaith love and marriage. Ann Stoler suggests
that “to study the intimate is not to turn away from structures of dominance, but to
relocate their conditions of possibility and relations and forces of production.”12 Areas
such as marriage, sexuality, and reproduction “tend to be critical sites of state regulation
and the focus of persistent state projects.”13 This chapter looks at how modern secular
governance has regulated the sphere of the intimate, and in the process, contributed to the
exacerbation of religious tensions, hardening interfaith boundaries and polarizing
religious differences.
The fifth and final chapter of the thesis looks at incidents of sectarian violence that were
triggered by interreligious relationships and investigates how the Egyptian state chooses
to deal with those incidents. It considers whether the perseverance of religious-based
personal status laws have helped in nurturing this particular form of sectarian violence
through constraining the conditions of legal divorce for Copts and banning Muslim
women from marrying non-Muslim men. It also examines existing patriarchal structures
in Egyptian society and how women bodies have come to represent broader claims about
their own religious communities.
Both the Muslim and Coptic communities have shown conservative stances when it came
to calls for secularizing religious-based personal status laws. Paradoxically, the

12

Ann Laura Stoler, Tense and Tender Ties in HAUNTED BY EMPIRE: GEOGRAPHIES OF
INTIMACY IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY, 13 (Ann Laura Stoler ed., Duke University Press,
2006), (2006).
13
Zengin, Supra note 3, at 225.

4

secularization of most of the Egyptian legal system, except for personal status laws, have
made those laws the only living witness to the religious character of both communities.
Accordingly, reforms aimed specifically at this body of law have come to be seen as a
direct attack on the religious sentiments of both communities. Michel Foucault has
famously argued that the real danger is not necessarily that individuals are repressed by
the social order but that they are "carefully fabricated in it.”14 This is particularly true in
Egypt since sectarian attitudes are reproduced within structures of governance and are
then reflected and replicated in the fabric of the Egyptian society.
Notably, my argument here should not be construed as offering an anti-modernist
critique. Rather this thesis is simply an attempt to investigate the various legal
technologies, such as the codification and secularization processes, that coincided with
the modern postcolonial state project. The contradictions inherent within secularism has
been pointed out by a significant number of scholars and academics. For instance, Peter
Berger15 and Harvey Cox16, two influential proponents of secularism, have revised their
positions on the subject. Other scholars such as Rodney Stark and Roger Finke17 have
also launched a sustained critique against the secularization thesis through their
deconstruction of antireligious secularization theories. Similar criticisms of conceptual
and empirical flaws of secularism especially in the context of the Middle East and Egypt
has also been highlighted by academics such as Talal Asad18, Hussien Agrama19, and
Saba Mahmood20.

14

MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON, 217 (Alan
Sheridan. Trans., Vintage Books, 1977) (1977).
15
Peter Berger, The Desecularization of the World A Global Overview in THE DESECULARIZATION OF
THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS (Peter Berger ed., William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 1999.
16
Harvey G. Cox, the Myth of the Twentieth Century: The Rise and Fall of Secularization, 27 JAPANESE
JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES, 6-8, 1-13 (2000).
17
RODNEY STARK AND ROGER FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH: EXPLAINING THE HUMAN SIDE OF
RELIGION, 79 (1st ed., University of California Press, 2000), (2000). See also Rodeny Stark,
Secularization, R.I.P, 60 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION, 270, 249-273, (1999).
18
TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY
(Stanford University Press, 2003), (2003).
19
HUSSEIN AGRAMA, QUESTIONING SECULARISM: ISLAM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE RULE
OF LAW IN MODERN EGYPT (University of Chicago Press, 2012), (2012).
20
MAHMOOD, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR AGE, Supra note 2.
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However, it’s not within the scope of this thesis to pass a value judgment or present a
critique on secularism as a theoretical abstract concept. Instead, it only attends to a
historically specific trajectory of secularism – the one that took place in modern Egypt. It
examines the historical transformation of the Egyptian personal status laws as they passed
through the processes of modernization and secularization. It focuses on how these two
processes, combined with the authoritarian modes of governance helped in consolidating
the legal ban on interfaith marriages, and in producing a particular form of sectarian
violence. By regulating love, the state has concretized the conservatism of both religious
communities and has produced a space for sectarian violence over women’s bodies,
sexuality and romance.

6

II.

Family laws under the Auspices of the Egyptian Modern State

A.

You Can’t Just Marry Anyone: The Legal Framework Governing Marriage

in Egypt
The concept of “secular” civil marriage does not exist in many Muslim-majority
countries. Egypt is no exception. In Egypt, all marriages are conducted by religious
authorities, and standard marriage procedures are both simultaneously “religious” and
“civil”. The ma’zoun, for Muslims or the authorized priest, for Christians, performs a
religious marriage ceremony and also acts as an agent for the state. For the ma’zoun, a
Christian woman is allowed to marry a Muslim man, however, the opposite is forbidden.
For the priest, both partners have to be Christians adhering to the same confession
(denomination).21 A restricted form of civil marriage, in the presence of a public legal
official, would be permissible in Egypt only in the following exclusive circumstances:
“1) Both partners are foreigners; 2) A foreigner marrying an Egyptian, however, even in
this case an Egyptian Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim foreign man; or 3) An
Egyptian Muslim man marrying a non-Muslim Egyptian woman.”22
Only interfaith marriages between a Muslim man and a non-Muslim woman is permitted
by law; the opposite, a Muslim woman marrying a non-Muslim man, is prohibited.
However, and in spite of its legality, the Egyptian state still attempts to limit interfaith
marriages between Muslim men and Christian women; it requests an ‘absence of
impediment to marriage’ document from the Church as a perquisite for registering a
marriage between an Egyptian Christian woman and an Egyptian Muslim man.23 Given
that the Coptic Church repeatedly refuses to issue this document24, this requirement
successfully installs a bureaucratic obstacle to even this type of legally sanctioned
interfaith unions.

21

Adel Guindy, Family Status Issues among Egypt's Copts: A Brief Overview, 11 MIDDLE E. REV. INT'L
AFF, 1-7 (2007).
22
Id.
23
United Kingdom: Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note - Egypt: Christians, 42 (June
2017), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5978ad374.html (last visited June 8, 2018).
24
Mariam Ibrahim, A Daughter Marries Outside The Faith: Interreligious Marriages In Egypt Are A
Constant Negotiation Of Obligations And Identities, MADA MASR, Dec. 8, 2017.
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2017/12/08/feature/society/a-daughter-marries-outside-the-faith/
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This legal framework governing marriage falls under the Egyptian civil code and is part
of the body of law known as the personal status law. In contemporary Egypt as well as in
many other Muslim-majority countries, the term ‘personal status law’ is understood to
mean the specific area of law which governs family relations and matters such as
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. The term ‘personal status law’ is itself
a modern legal invention. Historically, Islamic law never had a distinct category of
family law, or even personal status law.25 In fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), laws
concerning marriage, divorce and child custody were often scattered under different legal
categories such as contracts, offences and endowments.26 Today, Islamic law is the law
that governs the personal status matters of Muslims, whereas officially recognized nonMuslim communities27 (Christians and Jews denominations) have relative autonomy to
use their own religious laws to govern personal status matters of their respective
communities. In other words, legal pluralism in the area of family law continues to exist
today among the dominant Muslim community and the Christian and Jewish religious
communities, although it can be argued this legal plurality is in fact asymmetrical.
B.

Not All Laws are Equal: The Hierarchy of Personal Status Laws in Egypt

The overarching framework of sharia-based Muslim personal status law is the general
law, while the other Christian and Jewish personal status laws can be said to be the
exemptions (lex specialis) to the Islamic law (lex generalis). Islamic law of personal
status is the formal law that governs the marriage of spouses who adhere to different
religions or even spouses who adhere to different sects of the same religion
(denominations). For example, if a Catholic woman marries a Coptic-Orthodox man,
Islamic Sharia automatically becomes the applicable law if one of the spouses decides to
file a case in family court. Also, in the case that both or one of the spouses belongs to an
25

Hussein Ali Agrama, Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a Secular or a Religious State?,
53 COMP. STUD. IN SOC. & HIST., 495&517, 495–523 (2006).
26
WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARI`A: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS, 271 (Cambridge
University Press, 2009), (2009).
27
Officially recognized non-Muslim religious communities under Egyptian law are four Orthodox
Christian
communities (Coptic, Greek, Armenian, and Syrian), seven Catholic communities (Coptic, Greek,
Armenian, Syrian, Maronite, Chaldean, Latin), all Protestant denominations under one community, and two
dwindling Jewish communities (Karaitic and Rabbinic). Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses constitute the
most notable unrecognized religious minorities. See Berger (2001) at 96.
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unrecognized non-Muslim community, like the Baha’i community, Islamic law of
personal status becomes the law that governs their marriage.
In contrast, the Christian and Jewish personal status laws only apply in cases where
spouses share both the same religion and sect. Such hierarchical legal pluralism is
sanctioned by article 2 of the Egyptian constitution (2014) which stipulates that “Islam is
the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic
Sharia are the main source of legislation”,28 and article 3 which stipulates that “the
principles of Christian and Jewish Sharia of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main
source of legislations that regulate their respective personal status, religious affairs, and
selection of spiritual leaders.”29
The Muslim personal status code represents the majoritarian norms of national identity,
while the Coptic personal status code is framed as the exception. A clear example of this
is that non-Muslim family laws may not be applied if they violate Egyptian "public
policy" which itself has been repeatedly equated in the Egyptian legal literature with
principles which are “essential” in Islamic law.30 Accordingly, it is established that
Islamic law of personal status is the state law and the main framework for Egyptian
personal status laws.
All the other laws governing other religious minorities are acknowledged as customary
laws and are sanctioned under “plurality of religious laws (ta’addud al-shara`i’)” as it is
generally referred to in the Egyptian legal literature.31 Maurits Berger even argues that it
is more accurate to refer to this as the “duality of family laws” instead of the “plurality of
family laws,” as commonly referred to in contemporary Egyptian legal doctrine.32 This is
because a clear and distinct difference is drawn between the family laws for Muslims and
the family laws for non-Muslims in the current Egyptian legal system. In what follows, I

28

EGY CONST. 2014, Chapter I, art II.
EGY CONST. 2014, Chapter I, art III.
30
Maurits Berger, Public Policy and Islamic Law: The Modern Dhimmī in Contemporary Egyptian Family,
8 ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY, 88, 88-136 (2001).
31
Id.
32
Id. at 123.
29
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interrogate this legal hierarchy that developed with modern legal technologies, focusing
on how Egypt has maintained pluralistic personal status codes until today.
C.

To Secularize or not to Secularize: the Egyptian Legal Framework and

Modern Legal Technologies
As Saba Mahmood has famously argued, the process of secularization involved a
reconceptualization of religion that was “modeled on a dominant understanding of
religion rooted in the majoritarian religious tradition.”33 Secularism does not always
imply having a firewall separation between religion and state. It is a process whereby
religion and the state are intertwined together, producing the paradoxes and
contradictions of modern nation-states. While secularism disentangles religion from
politics, it relegates it to the private sphere, consequently cohering religion as an integral
aspect of individual and collective identity. Building on this point, the paradoxes
produced by the secularization of a deeply religious society like Egypt, was one of the
results of handing over the private sphere to the religious authority in exchange for
eradicating their authority over civic and political affairs. Hussein Agrama even argues
that the current practice of secularism, brought on by the modernizing project in Egypt,
promotes the politicization of religion. He highlights three features that underscore the
centrality of the modern state, and especially its legal power, for secularism: the active
principle of secularism, a public/private distinction, and a rule of law framework.34
In Egypt, and in other Muslim-majority countries as well, the perseverance of religionbased pluralistic personal status laws is not simply the outcome of an incomplete
secularization attempt. It also cannot be explained as simply a remnant of the era of
Islamic rule or as a symptom of the deeply religious ethos of Middle Eastern societies as
has been widely argued by some scholars of the Middle East. For instance, Herbert J.
Liebesny has previously argued that the “continued existence of differing personal status
law for various communities in one country is… an example of the survival of an
institution based on principles traceable from ancient times to the present. It is also an

33

Saba Mahmood, Sectarian Conflict and Family Law in Contemporary Egypt, 39 AMERICAN
ETHNOLOGIST, 59, 54-62 (2012).
34
AGRAMA, QUESTIONING SECULARISM, Supra note 19 at 72.
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example of the adaptation of a long-standing legal principle to the religion-based legal
system of Islam.”35 Moreover, the perseverance of religion-based family laws cannot be
solely explained as an outcome of the colonial powers’ willingness to grant religious
autonomy to colonized subjects in exchange for secularizing all other bodies of law.
The underlying assumption of these arguments is that if all bodies of law in the Middle
East were completely secularized, then the patriarchal attitudes that exists today in the
domain of the family will diminish. Clearly, this is an inadequate account that fails to
historically address the transformations in religious-based personal status laws over the
years. More philosophically, it fails to address the changing conceptions of ‘the family’
itself as it bargained its terrains between the intimate and public. It would be a mistake to
assume that if the colonial powers had enforced secularization in all areas of law, the
problems of religious strife and gender inequality would have disappeared. I am also not
interested in engaging with a hypothetical situation. I merely want to look at the material
transformations in personal status laws that took place in congruence with the
modernization process.
Secularism and the codification processes simultaneously transformed Shari’a from a
system of decentralized rules administrated by local muftis and qadis into a codified
system enforced by a centralized state. This is a chapter in Egypt’s history where
religious-based family law came to be confined to the realm of the “private”, as well as
reduced to the unit of the “family”, and thus was “no longer a tool for the execution of
divine law but one of the techniques of modern governance and sexual regulation.”36
The modern nation-state became the arbiter of majority-minority relations and in the
process, shaped the boundaries between religious communities through legislation. As
Talal Asad notes, the colonial powers’ willingness to grant religious autonomy when it
comes to family matters to their colonial subjects was not so much a sign of their
tolerance of their subjects’ religion rather it was a part of “the secular formula for
35
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privatizing religion.”37 This helped uphold the distinction between the public and the
private—the most central tenant of secularism.
Agrama explains the “active principle of secularism” as the principle that “the state has
the power and authority to decide what should count as essentially religious and what
scope can it have in social life.”38 This does not necessarily mean that the state gets to
decide on matters of religious dogma, but it means that it can decide what doctrine is
essentially a religious matter.39 More concretely, the state is authorized to distinguish
between the "civil' and “religious" dimensions of an act, such as marriage, and “on that
basis, decide whether the act is enforceable, punishable, or otherwise deserving of
protection or exemption under the law.”40 Hence, the modern nation-state gets to
constantly draw the lines between what it deems a “religious” matter and what it deems a
“secular” matter, while preserving its sole authority to do so.41
The active principle of secularism enabled the Egyptian state to deem matters of personal
status such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance as matters belonging the
realm of “religion” or as matters of religious dogma while simultaneously deeming
matters such as financial contracts and criminal offenses as “civil” matters that should be
governed by secular laws. Moreover, it was the artificial legal separation between the
public/private spheres that came with the secularization process that provided the
justification for why family matters should be governed according to one’s religious
affiliation. By upholding the public/private distinction, the Egyptian state was able to rule
that family matters belong to the realm of the “private”. Thus, they should be governed
by the personal status laws that are based on one’s religious affiliation, while criminal
conduct, for example, should belong to the realm of the “public”, and should therefore be
governed by a secular criminal code.
This thesis examines how different authoritarian regimes have utilized these different
legal technologies in order to maintain patriarchal family structures and govern different
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religious communities living under their rule in a way that serve their own interests.
These regimes have exploited their authority to decide what should count as essentially a
religious matter and utilized the modern artificial separation between the public and
private sphere in order to maintain religious-based personal status laws as they are today.
In what follows, I explore the historical development of both the Muslim and the Coptic
personal status laws and the impact that this historical process had on women’s rights in
both communities. I argue that one of the main outcomes of modernizing the Egyptian
legal system was putting in place a “glass ceiling” for progressive reforms when it came
to questions of gender equality under both the Muslim and Coptic personal status laws.
This has enabled the state to continue to limit interfaith marriages and keep its legal ban
and bureaucratic restrictions on interfaith marriage in place.

13

III.

A Feminist Analysis of the Modernization of the Muslim and Coptic Personal

Status Laws
The delegation of family matters to religious intuitions in Egypt, namely al-Azhar and the
Coptic Orthodox Church, for many decades has actively contributed to making any calls
for women’s rights highly contested by both communities. In this chapter, I first outline
the historical development of the Muslim personal status code. Second, I address the
impact that such a historical process had on the discriminatory gender practices in the
Muslim family today. Finally, I conduct an analogous discussion of the development of
the Coptic personal status law and how it led to many forms of gender discrimination
experienced by Coptic women, particularly when it comes to divorce. Essentially, I
interrogate how both religious institutions, along with the state, have redefined the sphere
of the family to the detriment of women.
A.

The Modernization of the Muslim Personal Status Law

There were two main processes that transformed the Egyptian Muslim family law: the
first process was the reorganization of the Sharia court system, which took place in the
mid-nineteenth century and the second process was the codification of Muslim family
law, which took place over the first few decades of the twentieth century.42 The
reorganization of the Sharia court system started in 1835, with the creation of the position
of the Grand Mufti (Mufti al-Diyar al-Misriyya). The appointment of the Grand Mufti
marked one of earliest steps taken by the Egyptian modern state to assert its control over
the religious institution in its quest towards secularization. 43 This reorganization of the
Sharia court system was then further asserted through the procedural laws of 1856, 1880,
and 1897.44 Eventually, these procedural laws led to what Kenneth Cuno calls the
“Hanafization” of the Sharia Courts (i.e. adaptation of the Hanafi madhab).45
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Before the “Hanafization” process took place, Muslims had the option to choose from the
different Sharia courts, which could issue a ruling based on any of the normative rules of
the four major Sunni schools of law known as madahhab (i.e Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i,
Hanbali). The “reorganization of the Sharia court system” process inevitably eliminated
the flexibility that was granted to Muslims for centuries; Muslims could no longer go
“forum shopping” or “venue shopping” as they no longer can seek recourse in the school
of law that best suited their interests.46 However, it must be noted that all four Sunni
schools of law have ruled earlier that a Muslim woman could not marry a non-Muslim
unless he would convert to Islam. This means that even before the so-called
“Hanafization” process, a Muslim woman still could not marry a non-Muslim man.
The main purpose of reorganization of the Sharia court system was “to make the
application of the law more predictable and uniform, a hallmark of modern legal
systems.”47 The introduction of the procedural laws of 1856, 1880, and 1897 led to the
encouragement and eventually requirement of the use of documentary evidence, such as a
written marriage contract, in legal proceedings.48. By the year 1911, “the courts would
not hear any claims regarding marriage or divorce that were not supported by official
documents.”49
Eventually, this slowly led to the codification process that took place in the 1920s. As
discussed earlier, the modernization of the Egyptian legal system also entailed its
secularization. Yet, this secularization simply never extended to the Egyptian personal
status laws. Only the codification process extended to personal status-related matters,
ultimately leading to the mummification of the religious rules pertaining to family
matters. For decades, the application of Sharia was flexible as religious rulings were
issued based on a multitude of sources, opinions and interpretations.50 Today, Muslim
family laws have come to represent a commitment to a codified, and hence essentially
rigid body of law.51
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In summary, Islamic law under the modern Egyptian state went from being a dominant
system existing within the confines of an Islamic state to a subordinate system existing
within an overall secularized legal system made up of legal transplants from European
legal codes. Today, after having lost jurisdiction over most other areas of law, Islamic
law lives on primarily through the Muslim personal status laws (family law).52
B.

Muslim Personal Status Laws and Women

Ijtihad (legal reasoning) is an Islamic legal term that refers to “the exertion of mental
energy in the search for a legal opinion to the extent that the faculties of the jurist become
incapable of further effort."53 Ijtihad is based on the assumption that jurists possess the
needed knowledge and competence in order to develop new rules of law through
reasoning from Sharia’s primary sources.54 Sharia has two primary sources: the Qur'an
(Muslim's holy book), the Sunna (Prophet Muhammad's sayings and behavior). A feature
of Sunni jurisprudence, is that, unlike its Shi’i counterpart, it “reserves the right of ijtihad
to a few 'ulama' (religious scholars) alone, who are considered well versed in sharia
(divine law) and fiqh (human legal theorization).”55 The rulings of the four Sunni
jurisprudential schools known as madahhab (i.e Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali), which
were coined in the eighth and ninth centuries ad., are generally considered as the
authoritative interpretations of the sources of Sunni Islamic law.56
Many authoritative Islamic scholars argue that the gates of ijtihad were effectively closed
by the late ninth century.57 However, many Islamic feminists today, put forth the
argument that the gates of ijtihad were never really closed and that there is an urgent need
to utilize this Islamic methodology in order to fight patriarchal norms enshrined today in
modern family laws. Amira Mashhour, for example, argues that Sharia “posits an

Jasmine Moussa, The Reform of Shari’a-derived Divorce Legislation in Egypt: International Standards
and the Cultural Debate, 1 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW COMMENTARY, 11, 1-31 (2005).
53
Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?, 16 INT. JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 3,
3-41, (1984).
54
L. ALI KHAN & HISHAM M. RAMADAN, CONTEMPORARY IJTIHAD: LIMITS AND
CONTROVERSIES, 1 (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), (2011).
55
Fatima Sadiqi, The Potential Within, in Adjudicating Family Law in Muslim Courts, 121 (1st edition,
Routledge, 2016).
56
MOUSSA, COMPETING FUNDAMENTALISMS, Supra note 28, at 122.
57
Id.
52

16

evolutionary quality based on ijtihad to interpret the texts in their socioeconomic and
historical contexts and to compare their relevance to the contemporary context as a means
of responding to the needs of the society and coping with social changes.”58 She
continues her argument by saying that “applying Ijthad, or feminist Ijtihad in particular,
based on justice, which is the core value of Islam, one can fulfill gender equality to its
fullest.”59
Another example is Islamic feminist Omaima Abou Bakr who refers to the recent works
of Islamic feminists as an “uninterpretation” rather than a “re-interpretations.”60 She
explains that Islamic feminist project is a “continuous attempt to un-interpret past gender
biased readings done by male jurists to come up with new interpretations that push for
gender equality from and within Islam itself.”61 She argues that Islamic feminism “has
proven the possibility of undoing the doings of patriarchy.”62 Other Islamic feminists,
such as Kecia Ali63 and Ziba Mir Hosseini64, also problematize Islamic medieval
jurisprudence by arguing that it was solely based on male-centered perspectives.65 Both
of them argue that male jurists were influenced by the patriarchal society present at the
time which ultimately impacted their rulings on matters pertaining to gender relations
within the family.66 Nonetheless, the work of Islamic feminists and their utilization of
ijtihad to come up with new interpretations, has been widely controversial especially in
recent Egyptian history.67
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The codification process essentially stripped Sharia of two of its most valuable aspects:
its adaptability to society’s needs and the flexibility of its rulings. By codifying medieval
Islamic jurisprudence mainly in the realm of the family, the Egyptian state has effectively
made medieval patriarchal norms, inherent in the rulings of the four classical madahabs,
the primary surviving legacy of Islamic law in the current Egyptian legal system. As a
result of this, many proposals that call for reforming the personal status code by
eradicating male dominance in family laws were and still are met with vigorous
opposition by religious contenders. Those religious contenders often framed such reforms
as attempts to Europeanize the Egyptian society and as assaults to the last “Islamic” laws
standing.
For instance, there was a proposed reform put forth by the Ministry of Social Affairs’
draft law, in 1945, which attempted to restrict both divorce and polygamy.68 The draft
law required a Sharia judge’s permission as a perquisite for a polygamous marriage.
Before giving out such permission, the Sharia judge had to first investigate whether a
married man had the financial ability to support more than one wife.69 The draft law also
sought to limit divorce through requiring a court order for it and it stipulated that
violators would have to pay a fine, or serve a prison term, or both.70 However, this
proposal never saw the light of day as it was meet by rigorous opposition by religious
contenders despite the fact that recommendations included in this proposal were justified
within the scriptures, and were not solely based on the opinions of jurists.71
Another example is the famous Decree-Law No.44 that President Anwar al-Sadat passed
on June 20, 1979 without the prior approval of the Assembly. Among other things, it
required divorce to be officially and properly registered either by a notary public or by
the husband's acknowledgement (iqrar) and ruled that a second marriage constituted a
harm to the first wife, and thus it was a legitimate ground for divorce, even if the wife
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had not so stipulated in the marriage contract.72 Opponents of the new law referred to it
as "Jihan al-Sadaťs law” and accused it of going against fundamental Islamic principles.73
Muhammad A. al-Samman, spokesmen for the Muslim Brotherhood at the time, even
mounted a vigorous attack on the new law and its supporters. He voiced his objections to
the Law, claiming that that it was inspired by Catholicism and the West. He further
accused Amina al-Sa’id, an eminent Egyptian feminist who pushed for more reforms than
those established by the mentioned Law, of being brainwashed by the West. “[T]hat West
which you glorify is the cradle of debauchery, moral laxity, and the dissolution of the
family. What the East has experienced in moral decline has come to it from the so-called
'civilized west,” al-Samman addressed Amina al-Sa’id.74 The relatively limited changes
introduced in Law No.44 of 1979 were short-lived as the legislation was later struck
down as unconstitutional on May 4, 1985.75
It is then clear that even moderate reforms to limit discrimination in the personal status
laws has been often met with great resistance from religious contenders throughout
Egypt’s modern history. Thus, it is not surprising that progressive reforms calling for
sanctioning interfaith marriage between a Christian man and a Muslim woman, are most
likely going to be framed today as an automatic heresy.
There are a few possible explanations as to why many secular reforms aimed at the body
of law dealing with personal status matters is met with so much resistance in Egypt today.
The first possible explanation is that the Egyptian regime is more concerned with
ensuring that the “secular” nature of the already mostly secularized fields of laws, such as
criminal and commercial law, remains unchallenged than with fighting patriarchy in the
realm of the family. Given that the entire Egyptian legal system was transformed into a
more secular legal system, the religious intelligentsia were worried that family laws
would have to go through those same changes as well. Thus, in order for secularization to
take place, there had to be a limit drawn on any reform that could affect family laws. In
the words of Lama Abu Odeh:
72
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In order for all other laws to be secularized, family law had to represent the
limit of, the exception to, or the sacrificial lamb of secularization… the
Islamicity of the rules on the family came to symbolize the last bastion of a
dismantled Islamic legal system, the reform of which threatened to flood
Egypt with the European and the secular. Thus, attachment to medieval
patriarchy came to mean attachment to the Islamic.76
In other words, the modern Egyptian personal status law was essentially a scapegoat
offered by the Egyptian regime to conservative religious intelligentsia to atone for
secularizing the Egyptian law in most other areas.
The second explanation as to why there is a special attachment to Islamic rules pertaining
to personal status matters is that these rules are often claimed or believed to be outlined in
greater detail in the Qur'an or sunna of the Prophet than the rules dealing with other areas
of shari'a.77 Those who oppose reforms to the personal status laws put forth the argument
that most Qur'anic verses have legal content that concern personal status matters and
consequently that Islamic rules pertaining to personal status matters should be treated as
sanctified critical components of Shari’a. As a result, any reformer that seeks to change
these “divine commandments” is met with accusations that they are failing to respect the
word of God. It is often argued that subjects of Shari’a, that deal with areas other than
personal status matters, are largely the products of medieval juristic elaborations of
principles and thus, while in theory ultimately grounded in Islamic sources, they actually
lack any similar explicit textual authority in the Qur'an or sunna.78 Moreover, since the
rules pertaining to these subjects are set forth in the technical language of juristic
treatises, there is often little popular awareness of or attachment to them.
The third explanation is that this special attachment emanates from the “deeply-ingrained
traditions of patriarchal family organization.”79 For reasons of self-interest and to
maintain their rights and privileges, men logically prefer to preserve the structure of the
patriarchal family as it is. Given that the majority of decision makers, legislators, and
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judges in Egypt today are men, it’s only natural that they would use their powers to shape
the law to fit their self-interest. Moreover, the modernization process, which was
accompanied by industrialization and urbanization, had an unsettling impact on
patriarchal control over women. Thus, men had to start relying more on law in order to
keep women in the same traditional subordinate role they have been previously placed
in.80 In the pre-modern era, forms of informal social control substituted for restrictive
legal sanctions against women both in the household and the public sphere.81 Thus, it can
be argued that now Islamic shari'a rules of personal status have taken on a more
important function today than the one they had in the past.82
In the pre-modern era, and before the codification process took place, Muslim women
had access to different Sharia courts that applied the different schools of thought. The
reform movement in Egypt has used the Islamic techniques of takhayyur (selection) and
talfīq (patchwork or combination) to introduce aspects of Maliki law that were more
favorable to the position of women in order to depart from a personal status code based
on the Hanafi doctrine.83 It may be true that the Egyptian Muslim Personal Status Code
overtime started to include reforms that were cherry picked from the four schools of
thoughts; reforms that were seen at the time as favoring women’s rights and/or serving
the interest of the state. It also may be true that the codification process led to some
improvement in women’s status in Egypt.84 Nevertheless, the Muslim Personal Status
Code has yet to introduce any new ground-breaking progressive rights that women did
not enjoy in the pre-modern era.
One of the major downfalls of codifying the family laws was limiting the alternatives
that women previously had which allowed various Egyptian regimes to then introducing
what was previously offered by one Sharia court or another as novel reforms. As Lama
Abu Odeh argues, “while secularizing the legal system in Egypt through European
transplants allowed for the possibility of either dismissing or radically reorganizing
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various elements of the doctrine on the family inherited from medieval Islamic
jurisprudence to make it more progressive, it was the same
secularization/Europeanization process that placed limits on and defined the ceiling of
progressive reforms.”85
The codification process ultimately helped put in place a “glass ceiling” for progressive
reforms; today any new reforms to the personal status code have to not only be justified
by Sharia, but also go through institutional complications of a modern legal system.
Thus, “radical” reforms such as abolishing the man’s unconditional unilateral right to
divorce, outlawing polygamy, criminalizing marital rape, or allowing Muslim women to
marry non-Muslim men fail to pass a long road paved with legal impediments, political
maneuvers and institutional checks and balances.
Notably, there are different methods of interpretation of Sharia law in different Muslimmajority countries. A major feature of Sharia is that it is not fixed and that it has
constantly changed over time. A look at the progressive Muslim Code of Personal Status
of Tunisia known as the Majallah and the more conservative Muslim personal status laws
of Egypt will support that claim. The reforms that were introduced overtime to the
Majallah did not completely reject Islamic values and principles but sought to
“modernize them by using a distinct interpretative approach to Islam that is unique in the
Muslim world.”86 Interestingly, the most recent reform passed on the laws governing
personal status in Tunisia was lifting the decades-old ban on interfaith marriage between
a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man.87
C.

The Modernization of the Coptic Personal Status Law

Currently there are fifteen religion-based family laws (one for Muslims, two for Jews,
and twelve for different Christian denominations) in Egypt, however, it is the CopticChristian family law that is most significant in defining Egyptian interreligious affairs
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and politics. Given the fact that majority of the population in Egypt and other Arab
countries are Muslims, academic literature has dealt more extensively with the Muslim
personal status law. For the purpose of this thesis, however, the same attention must be
given to the evolution of Coptic Personal Status Law.

Ryan Rowberry and John Khalil chart the distinctive phases of Coptic personal status law
over the past two millennia, using interviews with Coptic clergy and individuals, various
primary sources, and a multitude of secondary sources. The authors argue that reforms to
Coptic Personal Status Law in the nineteenth century were largely a result of political
changes.88 In 1855, under Sa'id Pasha, Copts were finally granted equal rights of
citizenship and were no longer obliged to pay tax (jizyah). In 1856, article 9 of the Treaty
of Paris, reaffirmed the Coptic Church's governance over Coptic personal status law.
Nevertheless, in 1874, in response to petitions by lay Copts, Butrus Ghali Pasha
somewhat decentralized control over Coptic affairs; he issued a decree allowing laymen
the right to form a Maglis al-milli (Coptic Community Council) which had the authority
to deal with cases related to personal status issues of Copts.89

Inevitably, the Coptic Community Council and the church clergy often clashed, because
church leaders felt that their authority was being challenged. In 1938, the Council
adopted an ordinance that expanded the scope of permissible divorce that stated ten
suitable reasons for divorce including: serious domestic violence, a three-year period of
separation due to untenable marriage conditions, and incompatibility.90 Although this
ordinance was the first attempt to codify Coptic personal status law, church leaders
disagreed with its “liberal” justifications for divorce.91

Legal reforms introduced in the 1950s quickly ended the dispute between the Council and
church leaders, while simultaneously undermining the Coptic Church's jurisdiction over
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personal status law issues.92 In 1955, Egypt passed Family Status Law No. 462,
applicable to all Egyptians. However, this law eradicated Maglis al-Milli courts,
“replacing them with state-run personal status courts based upon religious laws.”93 Law
No. 462 also constrained the scope of cases that could be heard in personal status courts
using non-Muslim law and determined that mixed denominational marriages were to fall
under the jurisdiction of Shari'a law. It also restricted the Coptic Personal Status Code to
matters of “betrothal, marriage, and the dissolution of marriage through divorce or
separation”,94 whereas the Coptic Personal Status Code had formerly “embraced all
issues relevant to marriage, divorce, separation, alimony, inheritance, financial rights,
guardianship, tutelage, and custody of children.”95 Rowberry and Khalil argue that
judges of the personal status courts, who were predominately Muslim, appeared to “lean
more on their cultural understandings of Shari'a rather than strictly apply Coptic personal
status laws as divorces were readily granted.”96

From the year 1938, when al-Maglis al-milli (Coptic Community Council) adopted the
ordinance that expanded the scope of permissible divorce discussed above, up until the
year 2008, the Coptic personal status code remained unchanged.97 Until 2008, Coptic
Christians in Egypt battled to get a divorce under the grounds permitted by this ordinance
especially under Pope Shenouda III.98 Although national courts used to grant Coptic
Christians divorces in accordance with the 1938 laws, the Church still viewed couples
divorced by the national courts as still married and refused to grant them license to
remarry.99 In the year 2008, the Coptic Church eventually stepped in to amend the
controversial 1938 ordinance and the new amendment limited the grounds for divorce to
only adultery and change of religion.100
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The 2008 revisions were viewed as unconstitutional by some Coptic activists and they
even filed for an appeal against them. In an attempt to appease the Coptic Church, the
Egyptian national courts have continuously refused to pass a ruling on that appeal.101 In
2010, the Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court issued a decision requiring Pope
Shenouda III to pay damages to Magdi William who sued the Coptic Church over its
refusal to issue a certificate to re-marry after he divorced his wife.102 However, Pope
Shenouda never actually paid those damages until his death in 2012.103 Post-colonial
Egyptian regimes, especially Mubarak’s regime, helped the Church maintain its financial
independence and to ignore court rulings concerning Copts’ personal affairs. In many
ways, this shows how the Coptic Church often times can act as a state within a state.
Under Egypt’s modern authoritarian regimes, the Coptic Church became the only
legitimate representative of Egypt’s Copts. Today, the Church has two main interests: the
first one is ensuring its institutional independence vis-à-vis state institutions and the
second is keeping its monopoly as the only legitimate channel responsible for speaking
on behalf of the Coptic community.104 The Coptic Church’s ability to have state-like
qualities was made possible through the perseverance of legal pluralism in the realm of
family laws and its relationship with the Egyptian state. Its control over the Coptic
personal status matters became an arena that symbolizes the power struggle between it
and the Egyptian state. The end result is that members of the Coptic community are now
caught in the middle between these two forces and their two loyalties. These specific
points will be further addressed in detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis.
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D.

The Coptic Personal Status Laws and Women

The Egyptian state imposes an ultimatum on Copts wishing to obtain a divorce: 1) make
an adultery claim, or 2) change confession or religion, in which case they would have to
resort to Shar’ia to obtain divorce. Egyptian activist, Ola Shahba, notes that Christian
women in Egypt pay a heftier price for the Coptic Church’s rigid stance on divorce than
their male counterparts.105 This is because the first option would entail fabricating claims
of adultery or admitting to have committed adultery, which, understandably, is extremely
difficult for women living in a conservative society such as Egypt. As for the second
option, Coptic women are still the main victims of it. Given the patriarchal nature of
Egyptian society, Coptic women are usually the ones forced to change their confession or
religion in order to obtain a divorce especially when they are stuck in an abusive
marriage. For example, Egyptian activist and feminist Dr. Azza Soliman has noted that
Christian women who go to report the abuse by their husbands in police stations are often
told to resolve their marital problems in the Church because the police fears that this
might spark sectarian tensions if they interfere in a Coptic household.106

There was even a recent case in 2011 that involved a formerly Coptic woman who
identified herself to a local TV station as Abeer Talaat. She was an Assiut resident who
said she converted to Islam to escape her abusive husband. She converted in September
2010 and then filed for divorce.107 Months later, after Talaat had agreed to marry another
man, someone reported her to the church authorities. Talaat said that members of the
church then forced her into seclusion and encouraged her to embrace Christianity and go
back to her husband.108 A group of Muslims heard of her captivity, according to local
media, and clashed with several Copts in the neighborhood of Imbaba, where Talaat was
allegedly being held. It all went downhill when rumors circulated that a group of Salafi
Muslims was coming to attack the church in Imbaba. An armed battle started between the
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Muslims and Copts residents within plain sight of the police forces who stood by and
allowed for the violence to break out.109 At least twelve people died and ten others were
injured.110

Abeer, like many Coptic women in her shoes, could not escape her abusive marriage
without first converting to Islam (the state’s religion). However, her basic right to convert
to the majority’s religion is viewed by conservative members of the Coptic community as
an insult to the entire community. Her free choice to convert to be with a Muslim man is
seen as “tarnishing” her community’s honor. Thus, conservative Christian forces wanted
her back in order to “restore” the community’s honor. On the other hand, conservative
members within the Muslim community often frame conversions to Islam as a victory for
the whole community. They do not want to allow the Coptic minority to strip them off
their new-found “trophy” female convert. Talaat’s case in many ways demonstrates how
conservative forces from both the Christian and Muslim communities often end up
engaging in violent clashes over women’s bodies. These conservative forces are
emboldened by the state’s legal system that aims to restrict romantic and sexual
relationships in a way that strikes a balance between ensuing the hegemony of the
Muslim majority and appeasing the Coptic minority.

Conservative forces from both communities essentially strip the women involved in
sectarian incidents from their agency. They both want to decide for their women which
God they get to pray for and which person they get to go to bed with. The state only steps
in when its interests is at stake, and in turn, it also treats women as subjects completely
void of agency; it views them as the property of the religious community they belong to.
This is made clear by the fact that in most high profile incidents of sectarian involving a
Christian woman converting to Islam to be with a Muslim man, the state often ends up
returning her back to the Church. On the other hand, in sectarian incidents involving a
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Muslim woman fleeing her house to be in a romantic or sexual relationship with a
Christian man, the state ends up forcibly handing her back to her Muslim family.
Talaat’s case also sheds light on the fact that Christian women from poor classes in
society have to pay an even heftier price when it comes to divorce than their class
privileged counterparts. Dr. Azza Soliman notes that throughout her work as the founder
of the Centre for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance (CEWLA) and her engagement
with certain Church clergymen, she found that the divorce process for poor Christian
women is radically harder than that for rich Christian women.111 She notes that Coptic
clergymen use a drastically different tone with a poor Christian woman who wants a
divorce, because her husband beats her, than the tone they use with a rich Christian
woman with the same problem.112 She even mentions that sometimes divorce can be
secured through making large sums of donations to the Church and through high-end
connections with the clergymen.113 Not only do poorer Christian women experience
restrictions when they seek divorce because of their religion, they also face difficulties
because of their class as they cannot bypass the restrictions posed by the church on
divorce. They additionally have to deal with gender discriminatory practices and
patriarchal norms that sometimes, for example, expect a woman to stay in an abusive
relationship for the sake of her children.

Christian women from poorer classes experience discrimination in ways that are both
similar to and different from those experienced by Muslim women, Christian men, and
even privileged Christian women. In many ways, they experience triple-discrimination as
they face the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of class, sex,
and religion. For one, Coptic women from poorer classes share the same concerns that
other poor Egyptians have about their inability to provide for food, medicine, and other
basic needs for themselves and their families. They also share the concerns of other
Egyptian women who face sexual harassment in the public space, domestic violence
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inside the household, patriarchal practices within the family, lack of access to education,
etc. Finally, they also face the every-day acts of discrimination as Copts living within a
predominately Muslim society where Copts often face discrimination both in public and
in private and are also sometimes subjected to senseless acts of sectarian violence.

Consequently, I argue that there is a need to adopt a more intersectional approach to
feminism in Egypt, particularly one that takes, incorporates and acknowledges the
religious affiliation of women and their socioeconomic statuses, when advocating for
legal reforms in favor of women. This is because intersectional feminism will further help
in scoring more substantive rights for all Egyptian women and not just class-privileged
Muslim women. The problem is that when women’s rights groups in Egypt secure a few
conservative gains for Muslim women with regards to the Muslim personal law status,
these gains are celebrated as achievements for all Egyptian “women” and are viewed as a
call for celebration for the mainstream feminist movement in Egypt. An intersectional
approach to feminism will somewhat remedy this the situation as it will shed light on
Christian women’s struggles in Egypt as well and their limited access to divorce. In
many ways this may help in easing off the tensions surrounding sectarian violence that
pertains to interfaith romantic and sexual relationships.

In short, Coptic family law was transformed by the modernization process just like its
Muslim counterpart. There are two main similarities between both family laws. First,
they both have institutionalized laws that disproportionately discriminate against women.
Second, they both have institutionalized the modern concept of the family as a
sociopolitical unit necessary to the reproduction of the national and communal life and
the preservation of religious identity. Amira Sonbol, for instance, notes how marriage
contracts in thirteenth century Egypt did not conceptualize the concept of the “family” in
the same manner that modern personal status codes do today. That these earlier marriage
contracts did not necessary reflect that the purpose of marriage is to start a family (usra)
and have children as they did not draw any connections between the spouses and
family.114 In contrast with modern discourses on Sharia, the family was not understood
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as being the “social unit necessary to the maslaha (comparative advantage) of the
community.”115

On the other hand, the major difference between both family laws is that the Muslim
family law “represents majoritarian national identity,” while the Coptic family law “is
exceptional in the distinct norms and mores it embodies, and in its subjection to
communal sovereignty—most potently symbolized in the Coptic Orthodox Church.”116
This carries additional consequences for Christian women who have to deal with sexism
within their already persecuted religious community. An analogous conundrum is
highlighted by Kimberlé Crenshaw in her paper “Mapping the Margins” where she talks
about the combined effects of patriarchy and racism black women have to endure in the
United States. Crenshaw argues that Black women are situated within “at least two
subordinated groups that frequently pursue conflicting political agendas”117 and that
Black women’s concerns remain inadequately represented by both. She notes how “some
critics allege that feminism has no place within communities of color, that gender issues
are internally divisive.”118 Comparable attitudes towards feminism could also be
observed in the Coptic Christian community in Egypt and that’s precisely why there is a
need for intersectionality in Egypt.

The Coptic Orthodox Church adopts traditional views regarding female roles within the
family and concerning women’s sexuality. For instance, the husband-wife relationship in
the Coptic Orthodox religious discourse is modeled after the relationship of Christ to his
church.119 A Christian woman “feels man is her equal without forgetting to be willingly
submissive to her husband, not out of fear or humiliation but out of love and respect for
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him just as the church submits to Christ of its free will.”120 The idea that is pushed
forward by the Coptic Church is that Coptic women should be more concerned about
their relationship with God and being good Christian daughters, wives, and mothers to
serve their community better rather than preoccupy themselves with issues such as
“women’s rights”. The former Coptic Patriarch Shenouda III even said in one of his
articles that “many speak about a woman’s rights, but the more pertinent issue is that a
woman is virtuous.”121 Furthermore, some conservative members of the Coptic
community would argue that feminism has no place in the Coptic community; that
discussing domestic violence in the Coptic family and Coptic divorce laws would only
cause internal divisiveness in the Coptic community. One of the consequences of this is
that there is a marked absence of social movements dedicated to calling for the rights of
Coptic women. On the other hand, there are movements that are solely dedicated to
calling for the rights of the Coptic community in Egypt, such as the Maspero Youth
Union.

The next chapter discusses yet another outcome that the modernization of the Egyptian
legal system had on personal status laws, with a view to understanding how the Egyptian
state managed to limit interfaith unions in Egypt. This outcome was the delegation of
personal status laws, or by extension the unit of the “family”, with the inordinate weight
of being the site of the reproduction and preservation of religious identity. The next
chapter explores how, under the auspices of the modern Egyptian state, the delegation of
family and religion to the private sphere has helped in shaping sectarian identities and
defining the majority-minority relation in Egypt.
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IV.

Legal Plurality, the Family, and the Coptic Community

A.

The “Family” as a Legal Category

It was around 1875 that the personal status law was first established, thereby marking a
significant shift toward “the family” as a legal category.122 It was by the end of the
nineteenth century that the unit of the “family” became a key subject of public discourse
and government policy. In this respect, Egyptian legislators followed the footsteps of
Western European countries. The term “family,” referring to a domestic group
comprising a couple and their children, acquired its modern connotation in Western
Europe during the early nineteenth century.123 It was during the late 1880s, that new
ideologies about the idea of the “family” started to be disseminated and debated among
literate Egyptians, and by the 1920s its main tenets ad gained widespread acceptance in
the middle and upper classes.124 The idea was that the conjugal family was the main unit
of society and thus the welfare of the society depended on the stability and soundness of
the family life. This new conception of the family emphasized this unit as first and
foremost a reproductive unit.125 The off springs of the family are the future of the nation,
and consequently the modern state should strive to install desirable characteristics in
those children.126 In other words, the stability and harmony of the family needed to be
maintained as it was viewed as the social basis for the coherence and well-being of the
entire nation.
Consequently, even though the family was to fall under the domain of the private sphere,
it still remained as a key site for social reform projects taken by the Egyptian modern
regimes. For example, in monarchial Egypt, “the family was one of the most important
tents of nationalist and state agendas.”127 As Saba Mahmood notes, one of the main
effects of the modernization process was the transformation of the concept of family from
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a loose network of kin relations to the “nuclear family with its attendant notions of
conjugality, companionate marriage, and bourgeoisie love.”128 The family, under the
auspices of the modern state, was seen as the nuclear unit responsible for the
reproduction of the society and the nation. The state of the Egyptian family was regarded
as a site where the moral, spiritual, and material wellbeing of the state rested and thus it
“became central to debates over how best to ensure the (re)production of healthy,
“modern” Egyptian citizens.”129 Debates revolving around family and marriage at the
time were essentially about the future of Egyptian society and the nation as a whole.
Egypt remained under British occupation throughout the first half of the 20th century up
until 1956, when the last British forces withdrew from Egypt. Understandably,
nationalistic sentiments were strengthened by an enduring colonial presence. Many
Egyptians were still threatened by the British influence over Egypt, even after the
Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence was issued on 1922, and that fear
lingered throughout the remainder of its monarchial era. According to Historian Hanan
Kholoussy, “many Egyptians during the monarchial era viewed the institution of
marriage as the foundation stone of the emerging nation.”130 This has entailed many
lasting consequences on how marriage and the family came to be perceived in the country
up until this moment. As early as 1931, the family became associated with public order in
the sharia and milli courts, and, by 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser declared it to be “the
foundation of the society itself.”131 Nasser even later established Egypt’s national family
planning program in 1966, which was the foundation stone of his state-building agenda
and a key strategy in his plan to create an Arab socialist society.132
Kholoussy notes that “the intention of Egyptian legislators was the ‘nationalization of
marriage,’ that is, the creation of married subjects who would form adult, permanent,
preferably monogamous families that, in turn, would serve as the foundation for a
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modern nation free of social ills.”133 At the time, there were a set of proposed reforms to
limit the marriage of minors, to curtail the ability of males to obtain divorce easily, and to
restrict polygamy at the time.134 However, the inability to pass such reforms is an
indicator that they were still highly disputed especially in a society where such practices
are religiously sanctioned.135 It is hence clear why the proposed reforms adopted a
conservative approach, as opposed to introducing more radical changes, such as
introducing civil marriage as opposed to religious marriage, and sanctioning interfaith
marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. For Egyptian elite as well as
the masses at the time, such radical changes were apparently too controversial to the
point where they were never even considered for debate. Interfaith marriage between a
Muslim woman and Non-Muslim man would, accordingly, not fit the state conception of
the role of marriage in society. Interfaith marriages, in the eyes of the state, would cause
an undesired social instability in a time of political uncertainty. The postcolonial moment
required national unity, cohered by moral and religious dogma and juxtaposed against the
iniquitous West with its secular legal system. Moreover, it will threaten to destabilize the
harmony of the family as children would struggle with their religious identity inside the
household.
Although marriage is supposed to be a private union that symbolizes personal love and
commitment, this “intimate” union still very much participates in public order.136 As
Nancy Cott notes marriage under the modern state has become is an institution that
“facilitates the government’s grasp on the populace.”137 Today, one of the most important
perquisites of the institution of marriage is public affirmation.138 It is the power invested
in the religious clergy by the state that institutes marriage. Marriage needs a license and it
has to be registered; it has to be legal; and to be legal it has to be sanctioned by the law.
The law sets the terms of marriage and the state enforces them. The understanding of
marriage as a contract between a man and a woman by which she is lawfully endowed to
133
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him with the objective of forming a family and producing children was actually a new
idea to the Egyptian legal and social sphere.139 As David M. Schneider has previously
argued, “pre-state societies did not specifically identify ‘family’ as a unit, nor did they
equate ‘family’ with women and children.”140
The modern nation-state has the sovereign power to create laws- norms against which all
individuals could be judged. At the same time, and as Foucault argues, modern society is
a “disciplinary society”. In contrast to the blatant and coercive sovereign power,
discipline can be described as a power mechanism that regulates the thought and behavior
of subjects through subtle and decentralized methods. This disciplinary society is clearly
articulated in modern institutions, whether prisons, hospitals, factories, schools, or even
marriages –the marriage institution. Disciplinary power entails directing subjects to the
“right” or “normal” path and defining any action or activity that does follow this path as
“deviant” or “abnormal”. Foucault situates the family as “the privileged locus of
emergence for the disciplinary question of the normal and the abnormal.”141
The Egyptian state today feels the need to protect the sanctity of marriage and the unit of
the family from being tainted by “deviant” forms of marriage such interfaith marriages,
especially ones where a Muslim woman is married to a non-Muslim man. Moreover, it
also feels the need to reinforce Islam, the religion of the majority, as the state’s general
religion. In fact, the Egyptian judiciary have even previously ruled that children resulting
from an interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man are to be
removed from the custody of their parents and instead placed in the custody of a male
Muslim guardian.142 Moreover, it previously ruled in cases were a Christian husband or
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wife decide to convert to Islam, their minor children are to automatically identify as
Muslims by the state regardless of the wishes of both their parents.143
B.

The Consequences of “Jamming” of both the Family and Religion to the

Private Sphere
Boundaries and frontiers separating between the state, civil society, and family were
“historically invented, institutionalized, legalized, and with time, naturalized in Western
states.”144 These artificial boundaries were later transplanted through colonialist and topdown state-building action into the societies colonized by those western states.145
Western states have invested much institutional and legal capital into creating those
artificial boundaries which later enabled them to divide social life into “spheres” of
activity.146
The public-private distinction that emerged in congruence with modern and law and
state-formation in the West became one of the main legal technologies used by states to
impose social control. Saba Mahmood argues that granting the three Abrahamic religions
in Egypt judicial autonomy over “private” family matters has created a “cathexis between
religious identity and issues of gender and sexuality”.147 It is true that concepts such as
religion, gender, sexuality and family have been historically intertwined, arguably
because the unit of the family has been historically understood to be the site for
reproduction and preservation of moral values in most cultures. However, Mahmood
argues that “the exaggerated weight that the family commands in contemporary religious
debates is an artifact of the state's relegation of both - family and religion- to the private
juridical domain.”148 She further explains that “what appears to be a natural affinity
between family values and religious morality is in fact a contingent effect of the
privatization of religion and sexuality under modern secularism.”149
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Given that the legal category of the “family” was never really secularized in modern
Egypt, inevitably the personal status laws remained linked to religious identity. It can be
argued that the Egyptian modern state’s choice to keep religious-based laws and to locate
them almost exclusively in the domain of the family does not necessarily violate secular
principles. In fact, one could argue that this was made easier under the secular modern
means of governance. Secularism is not only simply only about the principle of the
separation between the state and the church, it also “entails reordering and remaking of
religious life and interconfessional relations in accord with specific norms, themselves
foreign to the life of religions and people it organizes.”150
It could be argued that forcing citizens to marry according to the religious doctrine they
are born to is not exactly a grand expression of secularist values. However, one must
keep in mind that at the center of secularism lies both its regulatory impulse and its
promise of religious freedom intertwined together. Secularism posits the state as the
neutral arbiter that gets to decide what matters should be governed by religious doctrines
and what matters should be governed by the secular laws of the state. It’s the state gets to
decide when to grant religious exceptions to state-mandated laws and when not to.
Religious freedom can be described as a sum of claims, privileges, powers, and
immunities that governs the relationship of citizens of the state on the question of
religion. For how a state decides to allocate these sets of privileges and rights is what
distinguishes its own model of secularism from other models. Each distribution affects
majority/minority relations differently. The application of political secularism might
differ heavily depending on the context. In the case of Egypt, the state’s choice to
conserve religious-based personal status laws strengthened religious categories as
markers of identity that defined a person’s social purpose in the family, and in society as
a whole. By making the family, and by extension sexuality and gender, the locus of faith,
religious-based family laws exacerbated the contentious nature of interreligious
relationships in Egypt.
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C.

“Public Order” as a Justification for the Legal ban on Interfaith Marriage

The classical Islamic legal doctrine of dhimmi, which referred to protected non-Muslim
communities residing within the Muslim territories, in many ways influenced the current
legal formulation of the Egyptian personal status laws. Under this legal doctrine, dhimmis
were entitled to judicial and legislative autonomy with regards to their religious and
personal status laws. In all other areas of law, they were bound by Islamic law. The millet
system was closely linked to Islamic rules on the treatment of non−Muslim minorities
(dhimmis). During the Ottoman era, a non-Muslim community was called a milla (millet)
literally meaning “nation” and a milli court administered the religious and family law of
each community. The same system was adopted in many nation-states emerging from the
former Ottoman Empire. Though the Sharia and Milli courts were abolished and replaced
by national (wataniyya) courts in 1956, pluralism of personal status laws in independent
Egypt was enshrined in the law 462/1956 which limited the application of non-Muslim
family laws to parties “sharing the same rite” and “non-violation of public policy.”151
The modern Egyptian judiciary has managed to justify the existence of discriminatory
marriage law, while simultaneously adhering to the clauses of the constitution that allow
for freedom of belief and ratified human rights conventions. This was made possible
through invoking ‘al-nizam al-‘amm’, or ‘public order,’ which became the “legal
barometer of the coexistence between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in
Egypt.”152 The invocation of the notion ‘public order’ in the courts could be traced to the
end of the nineteenth century when the country adopted European legal concepts,
primarily from the French legal system.153 In several of its rulings the Court of Cassation
defined public policy as “the social, political, economic or moral principles in a state
related to the highest (or essential) interest (maslaha ‘ulya, or: masalih jawhariyya) of
society,” or as “the essence (kiyan) of the nation.”154 However, these "principles” that
make up public policy were never explicitly outlined in Egyptian legal literature, and thus
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their definition are left to the courts to determine, on an ad hoc basis as is the case with
European legal systems.155
The principle of “public policy” has continuously enabled the Egyptian state, particularly
the judicial branch, to interfere in matters pertaining to religious dogma. In contemporary
Egyptian legal literature, it is often assumed that Islamic rules and norms make up an
integral part of the Egyptian public policy. Nevertheless, “this central role of Islamic law
is never mentioned when scholars define public policy, but only when they interpret
it.”156 For instance, the Court of Cassation has previously ruled that: “Islamic law is
considered an [inalienable] right of the Muslims (fi haqq al-muslimin), and is therefore
part of public policy, due to its strong link to the legal and social foundations which are
deep-rooted in the conscience of society.”157 Thus, I argue that the notion of public policy
was hijacked for some dubious understanding of religious morality or what constitutes
the essence of society.
The Egyptian judiciary has oftentimes adopted a conservative approach towards legal
issues that pertains to Islamic law, in particular, towards rules viewed by the majority of
the Egyptian public and Muslim jurists as “indisputable rules” (nass sarih qati' al-thubut
wa qati' al-dalala).158 Remarkably, many of these “indisputable rules” discriminate
against women and violate freedom of belief for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. For
instance, examples of these indisputable rules include the unilateral right of the husband
to divorce his wife (talaq), the right of polygymy, apostasy, the prohibition for a Muslim
woman to marry a non-Muslim husband.159 This shows how a secular concept such as
public policy was utilized by the Egyptian state to favor majoritarian “Islamic” norms,
deemed constitutive of national identity.
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D.

Legal Pluralism’s impact on Coptic identity and the Coptic community

Anthony O'Mahony, Emma Loosley, argue that current marriage laws in Egypt help keep
the social separation between Muslim and Copts intact.160 They also note how both the
Muslim and Coptic community have used social pressure in order to discourage interfaith
marriages.161 They further argue that the Coptic community make up a distinct group
within Egyptian society given how Coptic identity is closely associated with Egyptian
nationalism.162 In Egypt, Coptic identity “with its strong family cohesion, and with its
customs, beliefs and values” is deeply rooted in the tradition and history of the Coptic
Orthodox Church.163 Building on this observation, one could note how maintaining a
separate personal status law for Copts under the full supervision of the Church became
seen as essential for preserving a distinct Coptic identity. Moreover, resistance to
progressive reforms aimed at the personal status law does not come from the religious
intelligentsia alone. The contemporary Coptic community in Egypt continue to exhibit
traditional views towards crucial issues such as personal status law and the limits of
personal autonomy. It is therefore not surprising that defending the Coptic family laws as
they stand today in Egypt is regarded by many Coptic-Christians as synonymous to
defending the religious tradition itself. Under the post-colonial state, the interference of
Coptic Church into the domain of personal status “has invested Coptic religious identity
in family law to a degree that is historically unprecedented.” 164
Today, Coptic family law in Egypt has become “the sole domain of communal legal
autonomy.”165 It is only natural that Coptic Christians feel that, if it was not for the
Church’s control over family law, they would have been forced to completely assimilate
to Islamic norms that already dominate Egyptian public ethos. As previously argued,
there is already an asymmetrical legal hierarchy since sharia-based Muslim personal
status law regulates marriages between Christians belonging to different sects and even
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inheritance and custody issues involving all Christians. Accordingly, Coptic family laws
on marriage and divorce have come to represent the essence and core of religious
identity. This view is shared by Coptic clerics and laity alike.
During the Ottoman era – like Muslim women who engaged in forum-shopping of the
different Shari’a courts – Copts and Jews had the option resort to Shar’ia courts to
bypass the more restrictive laws of the Church.166 This was no longer possible after the
codification of personal status unless one of the Coptic spouses changed their
denomination or their religion all together. In fact, today, the Coptic Church has become
far more aggressive in policing Copts. In the same way that Muslim intelligentsia fights
viciously any attempt to undermine their control over personal status laws, the last
bastion of a dismantled Islamic legal system, the Coptic Church does the same thing. But
in the Coptic case, the struggle is more intense, given that both the Coptic Church and
members from the Coptic laity view any attempt to introduce reforms to family law as an
incursion on the Coptic minority's constitutional right to religious freedom. It is seen as a
violation of their collective rights in a domain where they had preserved jurisdiction for
decades. This resistance to reform symbolizes more than just intransigence and
patriarchy; this resistance “says a lot more about the modern secular state’s
transformation of concepts such as “the family,” religious identity, and intra-communal
relations as earlier patterns of religious hierarchy and gender difference are
exacerbated.”167 For centuries, the Muslim and Coptic communities in Egypt have
created their own perceptions of artificial frontiers separating between both of their
communities.168 Both religious communities have “stuck to their ideas of frontiers
because of the social significance that they attributed to the frontier as an instrument of
delimitation and self-definition.”169
Today, religious-based family laws have effectively became one of the main tools used
by the modern Egyptian state to keep the frontiers between both religious communities
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intact. Consequently, the unit of the “family” became a scared site that is heavily guarded
by laws and social norms in order to maintain the existing power relations. To that end,
calls to legalize all forms of interfaith marriage threaten to break these imagined frontiers
maintained legally by the state, and socially, between these two religious groups.
Mahmoud Mamdani notes that “the identities of colonized societies are not simply 
consensual (traditional), they are also enforced from above, through law. At the same
time, law is not external to consensus; it participates in shaping it.”170 Having a
pluralistic personal status law in a post-colonial state like Egypt enforces and strengthens
already existing religious identities from above while simultaneously deriving its
legitimacy from the consensus that it helped create and maintain.
E.

The Fallacy of the Public/Private Distinction

Modern-day Egypt provides formal guarantees on equal citizenship in the secularized
areas of law and the constitution, while simultaneously institutionalizing religious
difference in personal status laws. Ironically, forcing someone to marry someone of the
same religion they are born into or forcing interfaith and intersect couples to marry
according to Islamic law is often disguised as an expression of “religious liberty” and
articulation of “minority rights” by the Egyptian state. The irony lies in the fact that this
move to institutionalize religious difference has contributed to many other forms of
discrimination.
In theory, a modern secular state is supposed to guarantee to its citizens that their
relationship to the state is not contingent upon their religious identity. Still, Egyptian
citizens are not able to marry, divorce, or even convert faiths without having their civil
status directly affected by their “personal” or “private” choices. Many feminist scholars
have denounced the traditional distinction between the private and the public sphere.171
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What is normally understood to be private (sexuality and family) is actually implied by
public society and its politics and vice-versa. One prominent challenge to the distinction
is that presented by radical feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon who argues that “for
women the measure of the intimacy has been the measure of the oppression. This is why
feminism has had to explode the private. This is why feminism has seen the personal as
the political. The private is public for those for whom the personal is political.”172
Since the early 1980s when MacKinnon was writing and until today, the public/private
distinction provoked much controversy within feminist discourses. There is a wealth of
feminist scholarship written on this false dichotomy. It is beyond the scope of this thesis
to go into debating how each strand of feminism understands and theorizes this
distinction. However, it is possible to identify some common ground between those
feminist positions which, despite being critical of the public/private dichotomy, still think
of it as a useful framework.173 In this context, public/private is often considered as an
analytical concept, rejecting the “mechanistic separation of the two spheres.”174 In many
ways these feminist critiques can be used to understand how maintaining a religiousbased personal status code has been used as one of the tools to oppress women and Copts
both in the “public” and political sphere.
Until today the Egyptian Identity cards lists the religion of its holder and this form of
discrimination is often justified by stating that this is necessary in order to be able to
determine the legal premise of personal matters such as inheritances and marriages. The
problem is that the use of national identification cards is not limited to personal or
“private” matters only; identity cards must be presented in order to be able to access any
type of government service as well as to obtain employment, education, banking services,
and conduct many other important private transactions and even to vote. Consequently,

Personal and the Political: Feminist Activism and Civic Engagement, 22 DEMOCRATIC THEORY, 163179, (2007); Sreyashi Ghosh, Beyond Spaces: Debunking Public/Private Divide in Understanding Violence
against Women in India, 1 INT. JOURNAL OF GENDER STUDIES, 76 - 95, (2017).
172
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, 191 (Harvard
University Press, 1989), (1989).
173
Brigitte Bargetz, The Politics of the Everyday: A Feminist Revision of the Public/Private Frame, (2009),
available at http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxiv/the-politics-ofthe-everyday/
174
Id.

43

having a religious based personal status is used as a justification for forcing one’s
religious identity to be constantly present and on display while engaging in everyday life
economic, social, civil, and even political matters which allows for many incidents of
discrimination take place. It appears that the private/public distinction is in fact an
artificial fragile concept as ultimately matters pertaining to the “private” will always have
an influence over matters pertaining to the “public”.
Conservative estimates of the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt approximate that Copts
make up around ten percent of the Egyptian population.175 I argue that its status as a
minority have pushed it to become even more resilient when it comes to maintaining the
Church’s monopoly over the personal status laws. The post-colonial state project pushes
for a homogenous state founded on the principle of citizenship instead of having an
openly heterogeneous society. However, what ended up happening in the modern
Egyptian state is that both Muslims and Copts were forced to homogenize under the
different personal status laws in the name of dominant reasonableness. This is the case
mainly because there is no “inner democratic form” within the Muslim or Coptic
community that can influence or reform their respective religious personal status laws in
any way. In many ways the post-colonial authoritarian regimes of Egypt have
successfully managed to manipulate fears and uncertainties surrounding the majorityminority relation in a way that serves their own interests.
In what follows, I explore how maintaining religious-based personal status laws has
enabled authoritarian regimes in Egypt to mold liberal conceptions of citizenship in a
way that is reminiscent of the hierarchical millet system. I examine how this process
helped different authoritarian regimes to govern sectarian identities in a way that
provoked sectarian violence.
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V.

Modern Secular Governance and the Management of Sectarian Relations

A.

Modern Liberal Conceptions of Citizenship

Citizenship is the basis of civic and political life in the modern nation-state. Legally,
citizenship can be defined as “a status that denotes membership of a nation-state and
which carries with it certain rights and duties associated with that membership.”176 In
classical liberal theory, citizenship is thought of as “a form of social membership used as
a basis for claim-making with which comes access to rights, privileges, and freedoms
allocated and protected by state institutions.”177 However, Shourideh Molavi notes that
“an account of ethnicity, culture, gender and sexuality, class and religion” has been
absent for the most part from the classical models of liberal citizenship.178

Classical liberal theory imagines a state that is impartial to and disinterested in different
ethnic or religious groups living inside its borders. It often frames citizenship as “a
passive and active membership of individuals in a nation-state with accompanying
universalistic rights and responsibilities at a formally defined level of equality.”179 Yet,
despite theoretical proclamations that liberal citizenship grants universalistic rights and
does not legally privilege certain individuals or communities, realistically this is almost
never the case. There is not a single example of a modern-state that completely grants its
citizens direct access to its privileges and protection, in a manner that is entirely
consistent with the liberal idealistic understanding of citizenship.180 This is not
necessarily because no state has ever applied liberal citizenship properly, but it’s because
the liberal conceptualization of citizenship is in itself lacking. The main problem is that
liberalism divorces citizenship “from its social and historical context, and therefore fails
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to take into account the way in which structural inequality restricts access to the resources
necessary to the practice of citizenship.”181

There are many well-rounded critiques aimed towards debunking liberal conceptions of
citizenship. For instance, there is the republican critique, which conceptualizes
citizenship “not as the means to an end, but as an end in itself.”182 The republican
tradition does not believe that individuals should be divorced from their community. It
believes that the true path to the good life “is through communal political life” and not
through the individualism that deeply imbedded within the liberal tradition.183 There is
also the classic conservative critique which is most famously articulated in Edmund
Burke’s book Reflections on the Revolution in France. The conservative critique is based
on the assumption that “citizenship and community cannot be artificially constructed but
must develop naturally.”184 Burke argues that rights can only have real substance and
significance when they stem from historical processes owning to tradition. He further
argues that rights will always be “contingent upon a complex set of social and political
arrangements which cannot be wilfully or rationally constructed as liberals would
maintain.”185

A third renowned critique of liberal citizenship is the Marxist critique, most notably in
Karl Marx's own 1843 essay, “On the Jewish Question”. In this essay, Marx argues that
religion is the product of a deep sense of alienation which would not disappear even if the
state is secularized. He traces the original foundation of this alienation to the liberal
separation between the state and civil society.186 Finally, there is also the feminist
critique that articulated by feminists such as Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacy187, Carole
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Pateman188 and Diana H. Coole.189 This critique mainly criticizes the “underlying
gendered assumptions of classical liberals' treatment of categories like the state, the
citizen and the social contract.”190
Keith Faulks puts forth the argument that “liberalism is an agency-based approach
because it stresses the importance of individual action and freedom of choice as
explanations of social change.”191 The liberal assumption that the individual can be
understood outside of the collective political community, disregard for the most part the
restraints that social structures, such as class, gender, and religion place on individuals.192
Thus, not only does liberal conception of citizenship fail to adequately address structural
inequalities, it also places the blame on the individuals for their weakness and failure to
utilize their citizenship in a liberal society.193

To better understand the situation of the Coptic minority in Egypt, I retract the main
steps of the path from the dhimmah status to citizenship. In this next section, I situate
liberal conceptualization of citizenship in the case of Egypt. I argue that although calls
towards liberal citizenship in Egypt might theoretically result in a better situation for
Copts than their status-quo, one must still be aware of its pitfalls and limits.

B.

Liberal Conception of Citizenship: the Case of Egypt

Modern Egyptian personal status laws were derived from a larger sociopolitical order of
the Ottoman period, known as the millet system. Under the auspices of this millet system,
non-Muslim religious communities (dhimmis) were accorded juridical autonomy over
aspects of their internal affairs. Interestingly, as Mahmood notes this “‘nonliberal model
of pluralism’ did not aim to politically transform difference into sameness; instead,
188
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various contiguous religious groups were integrated through a vertical system of
hierarchy in which Muslims occupied the highest position.”194 Over the course of the 19th
century, many aspects of this millet system were slowly transformed with the
introduction of modern nation-states and new concepts such as civil and political
equality.

There was a shift in language that came with the introduction of the post-colonial modern
Egyptian state. Novel terms such as equal citizenship and national unity were introduced,
which implied the “inclusion” rather than “exclusion” of different religious identities.
Under the modern Egyptian state, Copts are no longer called “dhimmis” and the millet
system that was previously employed by the Ottoman Empire has been
abolished. Theoretically speaking, non-Muslims are no longer “excluded” from the realm
of politics and are granted equal treatment and opportunity under the law. However, as
Rachel Scott notes, “an important feature of the Islamist discourse on citizenship in an
Islamic state is the emphasis upon citizenship existing alongside the religious social
structure of Egyptian society.”195 Given both the Muslim and Coptic communities’
resistance to any attempts aimed at secularizing the current personal status laws, one
could argue that the vast majority of Egyptian masses envision a model of citizenship that
preserves and institutionalizes religious difference in the realm of the “intimate”.
Nonetheless, one of the inevitable consequences of such model of citizenship is that
political conflict over religious difference often end up unfolding over the terrain of
familial and sexual relationships.196

The modern Egyptian legal framework ultimately retains the same historical separation
between Muslims and non-Muslims that existed under the millet system only this time it
is confined almost exclusively in the realm of the “family” and the “household”.197
Egypt’s authoritarian rulers ultimately have interests in maintaining the plurality of
personal status laws as it is; this plurality preserves religious differences which keeps
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citizens divided. The management and oftentimes the manipulation of religious
difference has developed as one of the cornerstones of authoritarian rule. Post-colonial
modern Egyptian regimes were able to reproduce and maintain a similar hierarchy of
religious difference to the one that existed under Ottoman rule. Only this time they are
able to do so while disguising it behind the new-found language of “equal liberal
citizenship” and “religious freedom”.

Famous slogans and chants calling for of al-waḥdah al-waṭaniyyah (national unity) were
hijacked and exploited across Egypt’s modern history to deny the very existence of a
sectarian question, while maintaining that recurrent sectarian clashes are only the
invention of the “enemies of the country”. An example for such slogans is El deen lel
allah wa al watan lel agmee (Religion is for God, and the homeland is for all) which was
Saad Zaghloul’s famous slogan during 1919 revolution to unify all Egyptian to fight the
British colonial rule. Another example is Yahya al helal maa el saleb (Long live the cross
and the crescent). These slogans along with others such as Muslim wa Meshei eed wahda
(Muslim, Christian, One Hand) promptly appear all over state media channels whenever a
sectarian incident takes place. These phrases in many ways have been used as propaganda
to sweep real sectarian issues under the rug rather than addressing the root causes of the
problem. For instance, Paola Pizzo notes how “the myth of al-waḥdah al-waṭaniyyah
(national unity) became the most fashionable political slogan”198 during the 1980s while
in the backdrop there was an increasing process of Islamization occurring in Egyptian
society.
C.

Egyptian Authoritarian Regimes and the Management of Religious

Difference
The modernization of the Egyptian legal framework was one of the processes that
ultimately enabled authoritarian regimes to shape, reinforce, and manipulate existing
sectarian identities and patriarchal structures in a way that serves their best interest. For
decades, the Middle East region has been plagued with authoritarian rulers who, in order
to preserve their rule, have often resorted to survival strategies. The most notorious of all
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is the “divide and conquer strategy”, or as Mahmood Mamadani calls it the “define and
rule strategy.”199 The “define and rule strategy” manipulates social and sectarian
cleavages and pits citizens against one another. This strategy was first introduced by
former colonial powers200 and was later picked on by Arab authoritarian
regimes.201Authoritarian regimes, accordingly, tend to be more prone to sectarianism.202
Egypt’s growing number of sectarian incidents over the past decades, only confirms that
the state’s function has shifted from one that supports social cohesion to one that
threatens it.
There is a considerable body of academic literature that primarily deals with the topic of
Muslim-Copts relations and sectarian violence in Egypt especially given the growing
numbers of sectarian incidents in the past few decades. The following section will outline
how Egyptian authoritarian rulers starting with Gamal Abdel-Nasser and ending with
Hosni Mubarak have chosen to deal with issues of religious difference and sectarian
identities and how ultimately one is the main outcomes of their chosen strategies was
sectarian violence.
1)

Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s Era

During the 19th century, members of the Coptic laity became more influential in Church
matters and Church-State relations. It was the year 1874, that saw the establishment of alMajlis al-Milli, which can be described as “a parallel institution to the Coptic Orthodox
Church with a mandate to oversee Coptic endowments (awqaf), manage Coptic schools
and institutions, and run Copts’ personal status courts.”203 Al-Majlis al-Milli, was
exceptionally progressive for its time especially when it came to issues pertaining the
Coptic family matters. As mentioned, it was al-Majlis al-Milli, which adopted the 1938
ordinance that expanded the scope of permissible divorce for Copts in Egypt
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exponentially. Nonetheless, the authority of this progressive consultative body came to an
abrupt end during the 1950s under Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s rule. The Nasser regime
adopted certain policies that attempted to “curb the powers of al-Majlis al-Milli and by
default that lead to the expansion of the power of the Church leadership.”204 As a result,
under Nasser’s leadership came “the weakening of the Coptic laity which was
accompanied by the strengthening of the political and social role of the Church.”205
A pact was formed during the 1950s between Pope Kyrollos VI and the State’s political
leadership.206 This pact entailed that the Church politically align itself with the regime in
exchange for unlimited political support given by the pope on behalf of the Coptic
community.207 Tadros highlights the role that the personal relationship between President
Gamal Abd el-Nasser and Pope Kyrollos VI played in resolving many sectarian issues at
that time.208 Moreover, Nasser’s regime was known for its tokenism which further
reduced levels of Coptic political participation in the government while strengthening the
Pope’s role in political matters.209 It was under Nasser’s political and economic policies
that Egypt witnessed its “first wave of increased Coptic emigration to the West.”210
Moreover, it was under the leadership of Nasser that confessionalism found its way into
Egyptian society after the loss of the six-day war in 1967, as many Egyptians, Muslim
and Christian alike, turned to mosques and churches after their disappointments in
politics.211
There are no records of major sectarian violence incidents that erupted under Nasser’s
rule like the ones witnessed under Anwar al-Sadat’s and Hosni Mubarak’s regime.
Nevertheless, I argue that many of the policies of Abdel-Nasser’s regime can be seen as
setting the stage for the sectarian violence that followed. Although it was ostensibly a
secularist regime, Nasser’s policies still had many enduring negative consequences on the
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Coptic community. It was under his regime that the Coptic community was forced to
become more homogenous under the hierarchical leadership of the Coptic Church, as the
Church assumed its role as the sole representative of the community. Moreover, it was
President Abdel-Nasser who curbed the powers of Majlis al-Milli, which meant that
under his rule there was no longer a parallel Coptic institution pushing for reforming the
Coptic Church. Under Abdel-Nasser’s regime, religious affiliation became the main
marker of Coptic engagement in the public life rather than citizenship. As the Coptic
Church assumed its role as the middleman between the Copts and the state under
Nasser’s rule, Copts could no longer voice their desires, anxieties, and demands directly
to the state through conventional civic engagement channels like civil society
organizations and political parties.212
2)

Anwar El-Sadat’s Era

The death of Nasser in 1970, followed closely by Kyrollos’ death in 1971, brought two
new actors onto the national scene: President Anwar al-Sadat and Pope Shenouda III.
Brownlee goes on to describe how in the 1970s, Anwar al-Sadat started to embrace the
Islamists as a counterbalance to the socialists.213 Inevitably, this lead to the deterioration
of regime-church relations under his rule. Under Sadat’s rule, article 2 which stipulated
that “principles of Islamic law (Shari’a) are the principal source of legislation”214 was
first introduced in the Egyptian constitution of 1971 as neither the Egyptian constitution
of 1923 nor that of 1953 made any such references. The pope unsurprisingly opposed the
introduction of this article and resisted what he saw as a creeping Islamization of the
Egyptian state and society.215 Sadat then accused Pope Shenouda of separatism, saying
“the Coptic pope wanted to carve off a piece of Upper Egypt to form a Christian state.”216
Against this backdrop, Egypt started witnessing its first major incidents of sectarian
violence in decades.
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Under Sadat’s rule, the renovation and construction of churches was the main trigger for
many incidents of sectarian violence217 and it is an issue that successive Egyptian regimes
have failed to address until today. The first major incident of sectarian violence under
Sadat’s rule took place in November 1972, after a mob of Muslim citizens attacked the
local Bible Society in the Delta village of Khanka located in the governorate of
Qalyubiya. Coptic Christians in the village were using the Bible Society facilities as their
local place of prayer, because there was no church in their vicinity which angered some
of the Muslims living in the village.218 Since the 1972 incident, more incidents of
religious discrimination and violence followed and tensions reached its peak between
President Sadat and Pope Shenouda between 1980 and 1981. In June 1981, the infamous
incident of El Zawya el Hamra took place as violence between the two parties broke out
over church construction. It left 17 people dead and 112 injured.219 Brownlee argues that
this was the only the projected result given that Sadat’s policies nurtured an environment
of interfaith mistrust and did not intervene to stop the violence when it began. It only got
worse as his political repression intensified; Sadat locked many prominent Egyptian
figures and placed Shenouda under house arrest.
Tadros explains that these attacks were the inevitable result of a series of factors that
contributed to the heightening of political tensions between Sadat and the pope, including
“the rise of Islamist groups, increased sectarian incidents, and the growing role of Coptic
immigrants as a lobby group in the United States against Sadat’s policies.”220 She adds to
these factors Sadat’s growing representation of himself as “the believer president” and his
support for the Islamization of society. Moreover, the 1980 constitutional amendments,
particularly those introduced to article 2, further complicated the situation, as the pope
himself openly and personally opposed the amendment.221
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3)

Hosni Mubarak’s Era

Both Nasser’s and Sadat’s policies paved the way for the sectarian violence that took
place under President Hosni Mubarak. With religion replacing nationalism, “matters that
should have been governed by law became flash points for identity politics.”222 In 1981,
Mubarak took over and maintained Sadat’s general domestic policies while easing some
of repression.223 Regime-church relations had a fresh start and the pope was released
from house arrest in 1985.224 Mubarak and Shenouda started a similar pact to that was
under Abdel-Nasser; the pope would support Mubarak politically in exchange of the
president giving the Church autonomy over matters pertaining to the Copts.225 As Jason
Brownlee notes, this pact, which can be described as a form of “religious corporatism,”
expanded the powers and authority of Pope Shenouda and simultaneously enabled
Mubarak to address the entirety of the Coptic Community via a single proxy.226 This
served to increase confessionalism as Copts who had political objections were compelled
to voice their complaints via the Church and not as nationals of the state. Pope Shenouda
stood as ruthless supporter of Mubarak even when lay Copts were against it.227 This pact
just served to sweep problems under the rug rather than fixing them and thus sectarian
violence continued.
To make matters worse, Mubarak took advantage of the rising wave of attacks against
Copts to his own political benefit. Mubarak instead of utilizing the law in the service of
both Christians and Muslims equally, “he positioned his regime as the only firewall
against sectarianism. For decades he and his coterie propagated the narrative that without
Mubarak’s protection the Copts would fall into the shadow of a zealously Islamist and
anti-Christian regime.”228 Tadros notes the radical change of Pope Shenouda’s tone and
discourse in respect of Mubarak’s government after his release from house arrest in
1985.229 This radical change was most apparent when Pope Shenouda endorsed the
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government’s position with regards to article 2 of the 1971 constitution, the very same
article he openly and fiercely opposed thirty years earlier during Sadat’s era.230 Tadros
adds to Brownlee’s analysis of Shenouda and Mubarak’s pact as she explains that some
of the elements of the tactical agreement that existed in the Kyrollos–Nasser pact were
restored.231 This pact also included greater collaboration between the State Security
Investigations Service (SSI) and the Church.232 One of the merits of this new pact was a
presidential decree which delegated to governors the responsibility for approving
applications for the construction or renovation of churches233 though in practice this
remained problematic.
However, what was new under Mubarak is that the Coptic Orthodox Church had to
negotiate the terms of the pact on several levels: the president, the political policy-making
arena, and the state security apparatus. This further complicated things as it made it
harder for the church to reach an agreement.234 She argues that in addition to the pope’s
policy of open support for the Mubarak regime, he also adopted a non-confrontation
policy toward sectarian incidents.235 Interestingly, though some writers might attribute
this change of attitude to the government’s crackdown on Islamists, Tadros suggests that
Pope Shenouda’s rapprochement with the government came earlier than this crackdown
which in turn refutes the theory of a causal relation between growing Islamist militancy
and Shenouda’s change of tone.236 Tadros also addresses the criticism of various Coptic
groups to the increasingly political role of the Church and its impact on citizenship. She
also talks about the Church’s failure to tone down voices of protest among Coptic
emigrants, during Sadat’s and Mubarak’s era, as they remained an entity that acted
independently of the Church.237
Mubarak’s regime resorted to informal avenues to deal with the problem of sectarian
violence rather than punishing the perpetrators in accordance with the law. It became
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almost an established pattern, under his rule, that “the judiciary did not hear cases
involving sectarian violence.”238 A report published by Egyptian Initiative for Personal
Rights (EIPR) on sectarian incidents taking place in Egypt between January 2008 and
January 2010 noted that the security apparatus (SSI) often tried to stop sectarian incidents
from getting to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for investigation.239 The SSI also bargained
with the parties to the conflict and pressured them to pursue reconciliation at the police
station.240 This inevitably nurtured an “ongoing climate of impunity” because the
government was unwilling to prosecute or get involve with incidents of sectarian
violence.241 Mubarak’s policies that dealt with incidents of sectarian strife was marked by
a greater involvement of the State Security Investigations Service (SSI), abuse of the
emergency law, and the use of customary reconciliation sessions.
All three of these practices were questionable and failed to stop sectarian strife as the
numbers of sectarian incidents continued to rise under Mubarak. For instance, Hossam
Bahgat, former director of EIPR noted that "between January 2008 and January 2010, we
[EIPR] documented 52 violent attacks on Christians or sectarian violence incidents in 17
out of 29 governorates”242. "[T]hat's very disturbing because it really is a rate of two
violent episodes a month in a majority of governorates,” he said.243 In an open violation
of the law, the security apparatus under Mubarak’s regime often held ‘customary’
reconciliation sessions in which victims of sectarian violence were often denied their
rights and the suspects involved in those cases escaped punishment. In some cases, these
so-called reconciliations even led to the forcible eviction of victims from their homes, as
has been documented by Human Rights Watch.244 Joshua Stacher notes that “this
238
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extrajudicial model encouraged vigilantism and violence, because perpetrators were not
sent to prison when they destroyed property or committed murder in the course of
interreligious clashes.”245
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VI.

Interfaith Relationships and Sectarian Violence

A.

Religious-based Personal Status Codes: One of the triggers for the eruption

of Sectarian Violence?
There are five different scenarios that usually trigger sectarian violence in Egypt: the
building and construction of churches, conversion, expressing controversial or
“offensive” opinions on religion, interfaith romantic and sexual relationships, personal
feuds between Muslims and Christians. In the first scenario, the law regarding the
construction and restoration of churches in Egypt, up to the most recent one passed on
September 28, 2016 by the House of Representatives, imposes great restrictions on the
building of churches. The law is characterized with ambiguous language with the same
dominant discriminatory logic, because it gives the executive authority and the security
apparatus wide discretion to determine the right to build and repair churches. As for the
second scenario, limitations are placed on religious conversion, although in theory there
is no legal ban on Muslims converts to Christianity or other religions. In June 2009, a
ruling by the Cairo Administrative Court stated that freedom to convert does not extend
to Muslim citizens.246 For the third scenario on expressing opinions of faith, article 98 of
Egypt’s Penal Code in 1981, criminalizing contempt of religion, has been used to limit
various forms of religious expression and only sanction the ones approved by the ruling
elite.
For the purposes of this thesis, I am particularly concerned with sectarian violence fueled
by interfaith romantic and sexual relationships. The scope of this thesis is limited to
exploring the personal status laws, and its historical connection and present impact on
sectarian identities and cleavages. Saba Mahmood notes that “a cursory glance at the last
ten years of Muslim–Coptic conflict reveals, a vast number of sectarian incidents are set
off by rumors about an interfaith romance, a woman’s abduction, and marriage.”247
Egyptian Activist Elham Eidarous notes that some studies place interfaith relationships as
the 2nd or 3rd reason for sectarian strife in Egypt.248 Moreover, a study on sectarian
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incidents that took place in Egypt from (2008-2012), found that the “escalation of small
disputes/fights” was the first trigger behind the eruption of 20.89% of sectarian incidents
recorded by this study (61 out of 292 sectarian incidents were triggered by this reason).249
“Muslim/Christian gender relations and disappearance of women and girls” was found to
be the second/third most common trigger for the eruption of sectarian assaults as it was
the trigger behind 15.75% of all sectarian incidents recorded by the study (46 out of 292
sectarian incidents were triggered by this reason). Interestingly, sectarian incidents
triggered by building/expansion of churches also made up around 15.75% of all incidents
recorded.250

In what follows, I explore incidents of sectarian violence that were triggered by interfaith
romantic and sexual relationships and/or religious conversion insomuch as it pertains to
interreligious marriages. I use a number of high profile cases that were hotly debated in
Egyptian media as well as low profile cases that were only mentioned in police reports
and did not make it to national news outlets.

B.

Incidents of Sectarian Violence Triggered by Interfaith Romantic and Sexual

Relationships
The infamous cases of Camillia Zakhir (summer of 2010) and Wafaa Qustuntin (2003)
share an almost identical story despite the fact that there was approximately a seven-year
gap between them.251 Both women were married to Coptic priests and both of them
suddenly disappeared from their home without leaving prior notice. In both of these
cases, violent episodes of sectarian violence were triggered by rumors of the involvement
of both of these two women with Muslim men.252 Both of their husbands accused the
members of the Muslim community of kidnapping them and forcing them to convert and
to marry a Muslim man. Following these accusations, members of the Coptic community
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took the streets demanding the state’s intervention and demanding that the state return
both of them back to the church and to their families.253
In both cases, the notorious SSI eventually managed to uncover the locations of both
women and accordingly they were “arrested” and handed over to the church
authorities.254 In the case of Waffa Qustuntin, the Coptic patriarch then, Shenouda III,
even used his personal relationship with then president Hosni Mubarak to pursue this
demand and Mubarak complied by giving out presidential orders to find her.255 Upon
Mubarak’s presidential orders, the state security police arrested Qustuntin and handed her
over to the church authorities.256 The church authority promptly announced she had not
converted to Islam and was holding firm to her faith. Qustuntin has not been seen or
heard from since and reportedly she lives in the seclusion of the pope’s monastery in
Wadi al-Natroun.257 As for the case of Camillia Zakhir (2010), the church authorities
handled the situation in a similar manner as they promptly announced she had not
converted to Islam, but that she left her home because of marital problems.258 She was
then held under the custody of the Coptic Church until her appearance on television
almost a year later. After her televised appearance, a public campaign that was sponsored
by different Muslim groups accused the church of kidnapping Zakhir in complicity with
the state, and commanded that she be “restored” to the Muslim community.259 At the time
of the incident, “mosques packed for prayers at the end of Ramadan became rally sites
where banners were lifted for ‘freeing sister Camillia’ and taking disciplinary action
against Pope Shenouda.”260 A number of attacks were subsequently launched on Coptic
churches in connection with the incident. Some members belonging to the Coptic
community even linked the deadly and unprecedented bomb attack on a prominent
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church in Alexandria (which took place on January 1, 2011) to the protests surrounding
the Zakhir controversy”261.
The above-mentioned cases were high profile cases that most Egyptians were aware of
as they were discussed on leading media outlets and TV shows. Further, other incidents
of sectarian violence, albeit of equal gravity, did not receive similar media attention. One
of those cases took place in the province of Giza where a middle-class worker tortured a
Christian man, after he caught him with his daughter at his house. The worker then
invited his nephew and together they tortured the Christian man, as they burnt him with
cigarettes and a heated knife, and then placed him on impalement until he lost
consciousness.262 The girl’s father did not try to hide his crime, on the contrary, he
carried the man’s unconscious body and threw it in front of the Christian man’s family
house.263 For the father this was an honor crime. The incident was then reported to the
police which quickly intervened and formed a blockade surrounding the area.264 The
prosecution then questioned the girl who said that they were simply in love and wanted to
get married and was thinking of conversion to be able to do so.265 This incident could
have turned into a wide spread sectarian violence if it was not for the fact that it took
place just four days before 2011 Alexandria bombing of the Saints Church and got lost
with all the fuss surrounding the bombing.266A very similar case recorded by police
report number 4702 administrative Hadyaa El-Quba267 but it was the Muslim girl that
was reported by the neighbors to be visiting her Christian lover’s house. Consequently,
the house was put under surveillance and the police raided the house when it was sure
that the girl was in it.268 The police then proceeded with investigation just to discover that
they were married with a orfi contract and that the girl was pregnant and she later gave
birth to a boy.269
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All law is inherently violent, as Jacques Derrida famously argues "there is no such thing
as law (droit) that does not imply in itself, in the analytic structure of its concept, the
possibility of being 'enforced', applied by force."270 The enforcement of law presupposes
a state monopoly on violence. The family exists by virtue of laws that police exactly what
and who institutes a family. The state’s enforcement of the ban on certain forms of
interfaith marriages and restriction of divorce for the Coptic minority, is a symbolic act of
violence. When people try to defy the laws that interfere with their own personal choices,
the emblematic violence inherent within those laws becomes translated into tangible
violence the public space.

What the above-mentioned cases reveal is that state restrictions on interfaith marriage and
conversions in Egypt, though they to blame, are just the tip of the iceberg; underneath the
water lies a much more complex sociopolitical situation. Foucault argues in “the Subject
and Power” that as the modern nation-state has advanced out of Christian institutions, it
inherited the “pastoral power” that these institutions originally possessed. That this
pastoral power of the state (which is an extension of disciplinary power, and an
alternative perspective to sovereign power discussed above), is not a force that lingers
above the people living in the society it rules, rather, it is deeply entrenched in the social
nexus of this society.271 So from a Foucauldian lens, the Egyptian masses have
internalized the idea perpetuated by the state that interfaith relationships are a taboo
topic; just the thought of amending the personal status law would be seen as a direct
insult to their belief system. They started to take the violence sanctioned by law into their
own hands, so that when a couple decide to go against the laws that govern marriage and
family, one of the reactions to that is sectarian violence. It’s like a never-ending cycle;
law which is inherently violent makes the society, and the society in turn makes the law
that is inherently violent.
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C.

A Feminist Analysis of Incidents of Sectarian Violence

This construction of nation as feminine is representative of the symbolic weight given to
women as procreators of a nation’s culture and tradition,272 in this sense women’s bodies
come to represent broader claims about culture, identity, and territoriality.273 “The very
language of nationalism singled women out as the symbolic repository of group
identity.”274 Ancient myths, such as Helen of Troy in the Ilyad and Sita in Ramayan,
about violent nationalistic struggles that started with women being abducted, and armies
(of men) mobilizing to go for their “rescue” have existed since ancient times.275
Ironically, Helen of Troy was never really abducted to begin, perhaps like Qustuntin and
Zakhir. Rather, she eloped with Prince Paris of Troy whom she has fallen in love with
despite being married to King Menelaus of Sparta. As many feminists have previously
observed, women are often the objects of such narratives but they are rarely their subjects
or agents276 as men are always portrayed as the abductors and women as the abductees
that need men to save them. This gendered narrative has not changed as women’s bodies
continue to appear prominently in almost all nationalist and communitarian struggles
(whether ethnic, racial, or religious) in the modern period.277 Thus, the incidents of
sectarian violence outlined above “are yet another example of the anxiety that haunts
relations of power across lines of sexual and gender differences.”278
Recent incidents of sectarian violence that involve a love relationship between a Christian
man and a Muslim spark outrage for the Muslim majority. Conversely, if it involved a
Muslim being in a relationship with a Christian woman, it is considered an anathema for
the Coptic minority. What’s significant about all the above-mentioned cases is that they
all involve a “woman” converting to Islam. Egyptian Christian men convert as well to
Islam and sometimes they choose to convert back to Christianity but no one bats an eye.
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Never has a Salafi demonstration went out calling for their “brother” to be brought back
and never has the Egyptian state intervened to force a Christian man to return back to the
Church.
Essentially, women are the ones who reproduce the boundaries of ethnic, racial, or
religious groups, and they are the “privileged” signifiers of religious difference and their
bodies are the symbolic repository of group identity. In these incidents of sectarian
violence, women's bodies came to signify the sanctity of their religious community.
Through these kinds of sectarian conflicts, women's bodies became arenas for violent
religious strife. This violent regulation of female sexuality and women’s bodies is also
largely manifested in the practice of honor killings in Arab societies.
Honor killings is well documented practice in Arab countries, and some Arab countries
even have in their penal codes articles that grants mitigation to male family members who
kill their female relative for engaging in, or being suspected of engaging in, sexual
practices before or outside of marriage.279 Lama Abu Odeh notes how “reports of the
crime reveal that poor women killed by their male relatives are more frequently the
victims of honor killings.”280 She further argues that “nationalist honor is upheld by
dividing women into sexual rebels (the well-off) on the one hand, and possible victims of
killing (the poor) on the other, and in a parallel fashion, dividing men into possible killers
(the poor) on the one hand, and disciplinarian, beneficiaries-of-the-killing-of-the-poor
(the well-off) on the other.”281 It should be noted that sectarian violence triggered by
rumors of interfaith relationships is also divided along class lines, as it often confined in
poor working-class neighborhoods and underprivileged provinces and villages.
In Egypt, a female’s honor is not only associated with her male family members’ honor
but it also linked to her entire religious group’s honor especially if her lover adheres to a
different religion than her own. Today, both Muslim and Christian women are still seen
as the bearers of the honor of their entire religious communities. This is why the act of
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women leaving her religious group, whether it is by choice or by force, is usually framed
shameful to her entire religious community.
The gendered narrative in the above cases, is built around the idea that women, especially
Coptic women, are vulnerable subjects void of agency that can be easily manipulated by
predatory practices of men belonging to the other religious community. When a woman
chooses to leave her religion, it is no longer an expression of her own religious liberty
because she is the bearer of her community’s religious freedom. Egypt’s asymmetrical
recognition of one-way religious conversion further complicates the story; Egyptians can
only convert to Islam, but not to any other religion. Even though both the constitution of
1971 & 2014 ostensibly gave all citizens freedom to practice their religion, this right was
once again limited by the concept of “public order”. In 1980 the High Administrative
Court ruled that “it is completely acceptable for non-Muslims to embrace Islam but by
consensus Muslims are not allowed to embrace another religion or to become of no
religion at all.”282 Logically, the Coptic community has anxieties over their eventual
dissolution from the Egyptian state given the large numbers of Coptic emigration to the
West283 and the asymmetrical Egyptian rules on religious conversion. It might appear to
be counterproductive for the Coptic Church to maintain its intransigent stances on
divorce as Copts who are stuck in an unhappy martial situation have no other choice but
to convert to Islam or change their sect.284 For the Church, “the issue of divorce
symbolizes the growing encroachment of Islamic law upon its teachings and upon the
Christian way of life.”285
Both the Muslim and Coptic communities are interested in maintaining religious-based
personal status laws as they are. For most of the Muslim community, the hierarchy that
places Islamic personal status law over all other religious personal status laws is an
articulation of their majoritarian hegemony and an admittance of the Islamic character of
the Egyptian state, both of which they intend to keep. One the other hand, the Coptic
minority is interested in maintaining its autonomy over the only body of law that the
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Church still maintains its control over. From the perspective of the church, civil marriage
would diminish the church’s control over the community, and that, it is feared, would
lead to the dissolution of Coptic identity. Civil marriage also provides easier paths to
conversion, which would further decrease the numbers of Coptic Christians in Egypt.286
The same fear surrounds interfaith marriages, which, while rare, are usually accompanied
with religious conversion and are thus considered a loss.287 Thus there are vested
interests: for Christians, keeping the religious identity of the marriage helps preserve the
balance between the Coptic and the Muslim communities.
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VII.

Conclusion:

Marriage is often romanticized in the popular imagination as the union of two people as
partners in a romantic and personal relationship. However, the realties and state
restrictions imposed on the marriage institution today distorts this simplistic
understanding of marriage. Marriage in many ways can act as an influential hegemonic
tool that helps the state with defining and dividing the society on the bases of identity, be
it gender, class, or religion. In Egypt, marriage is a legal right granted only to couples
that will reproduce “normal,” “healthy,” “hetrosexual” and “homogeneous” off springs
who would turn into ideal citizens in the future. By sanctioning certain types of marriages
and prohibiting others, the state attempts to ensure the stability of the society and
homogeneousness the religious communities living within its borders. Through its
maintenance of pluralistic religious-based personal status laws, the Egyptian state gets to
attain the best of both worlds: it got to ensure the hegemony of the Muslim majority
while simultaneously appeasing the Coptic minority.
The main difference between the current Muslim and Coptic personal status laws is that
the former represents majoritarian national identity, while the latter is framed as an
exception. On the other hand, the main similarities between the two bodies of law is that
they both conceptualize the concept of the family in a similar way while discriminating
against women from their respective communities in their own distinct ways.
Both women and Coptic Christians are situated between overlapping structures of
subordination. The Egyptian state governs sects in the same way it governs sex. Women
and Coptic Christians are not just subordinate in the Egyptian legal framework; they are
similarly subordinate. Both groups are viewed as subordinate from the point of view of
family laws. Islamic Shar’ia is seen as the overarching system that governs all of family
law matters, while the Coptic family law is framed as its subsidiary exception. Thus, the
idea that being Muslim is the gold standard while being Christian is the exemption is
reinforced. Similarly, women are treated by family laws as subordinates to the men of
their respective religious communities. Egyptian family laws have actively served in
reinforcing patriarchal gender dynamics and perpetuating ideas about women's
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subordinate place within the family. In that sense, men become are framed as the superior
subject of family law and women as the inferior.
Moreover, Coptic Christians are punished by violence in the same way women are
punished by it. Christians will be punished for actions that Muslims get to do without any
repercussions, such as for their efforts to proselytize, praying in vicinities not licensed as
churches, and renovating churches without permits. In the same token, Egyptian women
are subjected to violence for their sexual conduct or for expressing their sexuality; acts
that their male counterpart often get away without suffering any consequences. It’s
important to remember the intersections of patriarchy, sectarianism, and classism when
talking about a complex issue such as sectarian violence triggered by interfaith
relationships between Egyptian men and women. As has been mentioned in this thesis,
underprivileged Coptic women belong to three overlapping structures of subordination.
Thus, the consequences they suffer for their expressing their personal autonomy does not
take place in a vacuum and cannot be separable from their overlapping identities as
Copts, women, and individuals coming from an underprivileged class.
The conservative attitudes the Coptic minority have shown towards marriage, divorce,
and freedom of religion show that while the Copts oppose having Islamic law as the
overarching law, they still want an understanding of citizenship that preserves the
centrality of the church. They fear that the Coptic community will eventually disappear.
The Christian family is the center of the Coptic community, as such, personal status laws
need to remain as they are. However, the paradox lies in the fact that this emphasis on
personal status law reinforces the Church’s emergence as a political and social
representative of the Copts, which seems incongruent to liberal conceptions of
citizenship.
The language used by the Coptic community to call for their rights as equal citizens has
endorsed religion as the marker of their group identity while simultaneously emboldening
the modern ‘secular’ state as the de facto arbiter and definer of religious difference. It’s
within the state’s best interest to define, regulate, and reshape religion in the image of the
majority. The state will utilize secular concepts such as “public order” to allow the
religion of the majority to become the ‘neutral’ standard by which minority groups and
68

religions are judged against. This was one of the factors that enabled the MuslimChristian relation in Egypt to take on its particular form that we witness today, a
relationship that is marked by discrimination against the Coptic community and episodes
of sectarian violence.
The historical development of both the Muslim and Coptic personal status laws and the
introduction of modern legal technologies have both helped shape the current Egyptian
legal framework. Religious-based personal status laws, a leftover from the Ottoman
millet system, underwent various transformations under the modern nation-state. The
legal pluralism of the Egyptian legislative system in many ways highlights the paradoxes
and tensions created by modernity. On one end of the spectrum, there is the notion of
equal citizenship which attempts to eradicate religious difference and on the other end
there the religious based personal status laws which exacerbates religious difference by
dividing citizens into separate legal communities. I argue that in order to form a complete
picture around the problem of sectarianism in Egypt, one needs not to ignore the
structural tensions created by the postcolonial state and the model of religion–state
accommodation adopted by the Egyptian state.
The publically recognizable personality of the Egyptian state is heavily mediated by its
Islamic character. Initially, it appears that the simple answer to solve the problem of state
restrictions on interfaith romantic and sexual relationships is to extend the secularization
process to the personal status laws. However, the application of Shari’a has always had a
secular tool that complemented it. There had been no point in modern Egyptian legal
history when Shari’a had been strictly adhered to. In fact, the modernization process of
the Egyptian legislative system was one of the historical processes that led to the laws
being the way they are currently. The model of secularism that was implemented in
Egypt did not guarantee religious tolerance, rather it has consistently placed the Coptic
minority in a defensive position.
Religious-based family laws have also been entrenched in society to the extent that they
have been internalized by both the Muslim and the Coptic communities, and came to
define the very identity of both communities. In that sense, law has been successful – it
has divided society. As Talal Asad notes “the law never seeks to eliminate violence since
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its object is always to regulate violence.”288 Law has been internalized by the collective
consciousness as truly a manifestation of society’s own desires. As a result of this, the
symbolic violence inherent within the laws came to be materialized in the form of
episodes of sectarian violence whenever someone attempted to go against those laws or
norms. Only this time this violence was not necessarily perpetuated by the state but rather
by the people themselves.
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